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ABSTRACT:  
Both intergenerational and intratemporal equity are central to the examination of policy towards 
climate change. However, many discussions of intergenerational issues have been marred by serious 
analytical errors, particularly in applying standard approaches to discounting; the errors arise, in part, 
from paying insufficient attention to the magnitude of potential damages, and is part from 
overlooking problems with market information. Some of the philosophical concepts and principles of 
Paper 1 are applied to the analytics and ethics of pure-time discounting and infinite-horizon models, 
providing helpful insights into orderings of welfare streams and obligations towards future 
generations. Such principles give little support for the idea of discrimination by date of birth. 
Intratemporal issues are central to problematic and slow-moving international discussions and are 
the second focus of this paper. A way forward is to cast the policy issues and analyses in a way that 
keeps equity issues central and embeds them in the challenge of fostering the dynamic transition to 
the low-carbon economy in both developed and developing countries. This avoids the trap of seeing 
issues primarily in terms of burden-sharing and zero-sum games – that leads to inaction and the 
most inequitable outcome of all. 
 
INTRODUCTION:  
Equity and distributional issues, both inter- and intra-temporal, loom large in discussions of national 
and international policy towards climate change. They are the focus of this paper. All too often 
equity criteria are invoked in an arbitrary way, with little or no attempt to anchor them in ethical 
principles or link them to the basics of public economics. Any application of principles must also be 
tailored to the fundamentals of the problem at hand, which in the case of climate change are shaped 
by the science. Accordingly, this paper builds on the foundation of its predecessor in this two-part 
series which examined the science and ethics, and takes that discussion forward to examine issues of 
equity, examining the economics and politics of the key policy issues. 
 
                                                          
*
 My thanks to Christopher Bliss, Alex Bowen, John Broome, Nancy Cartwright, Raj Chetty, Janet Currie, Angus 
Deaton, Peter Diamond, Simon Dietz, Ottmar Edenhofer, Cameron Hepburn, Dale Jamieson, Kirit Parikh, 
Mattia Romani, Amartya Sen, Ioanna Sikiaridi, Michael Spackman, Chris Taylor, Bob Ward, Martin Weitzman 
and Dimitri Zenghelis for helpful guidance and comments. I am especially grateful to James Rydge for his work 
on this paper. The editors and referees provided valuable comments for which I am very grateful. The opinions 
and views expressed, and any errors, are my own.   
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Part 1 of this second paper concerns primarily intertemporal issues and the appropriate analytical 
frameworks, including discounting.  Many of the key decisions concerning climate change relate 
actions we may take now to possible consequences in the future.  Some of these consequences will 
be far into the future and many or most of them will be uncertain.  How should we evaluate such 
consequences, relative to costs or benefits today, when many of these consequences are difficult to 
understand and could occur in a diverse range of possible circumstances?   
 
In this context we examine and illustrate the limitations of standard approaches to discounting, and 
draw attention to a collection of serious analytical errors which have arisen in the literature on 
climate change, and which continue to arise, as a result of applying such approaches in an 
unconsidered way. All too often, intertemporal social valuations are derived from an exogenously-
imposed set of discount rates. This is a basic error in this context, arising from misunderstanding the 
scale of the risks indicated by the science and often from ignoring the basic principles of shadow 
prices and marginal valuations: these are not marginal changes and marginal valuations are 
endogenous to our decisions.  
 
These errors are often compounded by ignoring key market failures, and mis-specification of the 
ethical questions, in an attempt to base exogenous discount rates on markets. It is argued here that 
we can expect little serious guidance from market rates for a whole series of basic reasons. These 
include: the scale of risk could make the future look very different from the past and result in 
economic decline; the decisions at issue are collective and long-term not individual and short or 
medium-term; markets have gross imperfections, particularly in relation to risk; and, the problem 
cannot sensibly be examined in a one-good consumption framework, because lives are at stake and 
the physical environment is critical.  
 
Similarly, attempting to infer social values from “inverse optimum” analyses of public decisions is 
undermined by the need to model the constraints and incentive structures which are assumed to be 
perceived by the "optimisers". The answers which emerge in such analyses are very sensitive to the 
assumptions on those perceptions. Given that the exogenous/market route is fatally flawed in this 
context and that the social-inverse optimum problem gives results that are so sensitive to 
assumptions, we must return to basic ethical discussions if we are to inform the social values behind 
intertemporal discounting. 
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In Part 2 we examine distribution and equity across people and countries, and thus intratemporal 
issues.  This discussion takes us directly to challenges which are central to international policy 
discussions. These discussions have seen a number of suggestions for formulaic approaches to 
equity in relation to group or country allocations of, quotas for, or rights to "carbon space". These 
usually have weak foundations scientifically, ethically and economically.  Further, there are deep 
political difficulties which have strong ethical and economic dimensions: various attempts to create 
“formulae for equity” tend to point to “allocations of emissions rights or permits”, which would give 
large resource transfers to poor countries relative to current conditions. Whilst the ethical case for 
large transfers does seem strong, rich countries are most unlikely to accept the arguments for so 
doing.   
 
It would make little ethical, political or practical sense, however, to abandon an attempt to embody 
ethics in policy, because of the difficulties of a particular formulaic approach and the intransigence 
of rich countries. If we do not face seriously and constructively the equity and ethical issues that are 
integral to climate change in international discussions and policy making, we risk deadlock and weak 
action. That could yield arguably the most inequitable outcome of all – it is poor people who are hit 
earliest and hardest by climate change. 
 
There is a way forward: reframing interpersonal and cross-country questions in terms of "equitable 
access to sustainable development", language used in the 2010 Cancun agreement of the UNFCCC. 
This approach maintains equity issues as central and embeds them in the idea of rich country 
support for fostering the dynamic and attractive transition to the low-carbon economy in both their 
own countries and as a driver of growth and poverty reduction in the developing world. The 
approach frames the questions in an analysis which reflects the role and nature of the necessary 
economic change, involving learning and innovation, and shows the potential for shared and 
recognisable mutual gain. It contrasts with the language of "burden-sharing" which frames the 
problem, misleadingly, in a static way and with similarities to a zero-sum game. 
 
Policies for sustainable development and overcoming poverty require breaking the link between 
production and consumption activities on the one hand and emissions on the other.  Essentially, as 
argued in Paper 1, we need a new energy-industrial revolution. Getting decisions on action on the 
necessary scale requires clarity on five key issues and propositions: first, the scale of emissions 
reductions; second, that a dynamic and radical economic transformation is required; third, that it 
will have many attractive features beyond reducing climate risk; fourth, that it is a sustainable 
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growth story with great potential for overcoming poverty; fifth, substantial investment and new 
technologies are required. Such a picture of the required response, including its radical nature and 
the importance of the dynamics of learning and transition, is a crucial part of the whole challenge of 
putting the science, ethics and economics together. Describing the severe consequences of inaction 
or business-as-usual is, of course, a fundamental part of the ethical and policy analysis; but 
understanding, discussion and agreement fare much better if this is accompanied by a description of 
the alternative paths and why they look so much more attractive, over and above the radical 
reductions in climate risks they can deliver.  The alternative paths do indeed appear to be cleaner, 
quieter, safer, more secure and more bio-diverse. 
 
The framing of the ethical discussion and its conclusions can profoundly influence the way in which 
political, economic and social issues are understood or perceived. Reasoned ethical argument, its 
foundations, and the way it is conducted are vital to policy-making, not just conceptually, but also 
practically.  Philosophy without understanding the basics of economic analysis does not get us far. 
But, if economists are to engage seriously with policy on climate change, there is no alternative to 
serious engagement with the ethical issues.  This is an ethical discussion that matters. 
 
 
PART 1  :  ECONOMICS AND ETHICS OF INTERTEMPORAL VALUES AND DISCOUNTING 
 
1.1 Discounting and the big picture 
Many of the decisions concerning climate change relate actions we may take now to possible 
consequences in the future.  Some of these consequences will be far into the future and many or 
most of them will be uncertain.  How should we evaluate such consequences, many of which are 
difficult to understand and could occur in a diverse range of possible circumstances, relative to costs 
or benefits which take place now?  This sounds like the “familiar” problem in the economic appraisal 
of projects of discounting an incremental benefit of one unit of some numeraire good in the future 
relative to one unit of that good now. If this were a set of issues involving fairly minor changes and 
the assumption of one good were not misleading then I would not raise queries about language. In 
this context, however, I think it is “intertemporal values and valuations” that we should use rather 
than “discounting”. 
 
To insist on the term discounting in this context runs the risk of shoe-horning this part of the 
economics and ethics of climate change into a very narrow form.  Indeed sometimes it appears that 
some imagine that policy analysis on climate change can be reduced to a discussion about a single 
number, "the discount rate", a concept still narrower than discounting.  
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Let us begin by defining the relevant concepts and then place them in the context of the scale of risk, 
and of necessary change, and the arguments for action. The rate of fall of the discount factor for a 
given good at time t is the discount rate for that good at that time; where the discount factor is the 
relative value of a unit of the good at some date in the future, t, to a unit of that good now. The 
discount rate or factor will usually depend on both the good and the time being considered.  The 
value of an extra unit of a good is generally assessed by looking at the impact on a social welfare 
function of the availability of an extra unit of that good.  This is essentially the definition of a shadow 
price, see e.g. Drèze and Stern (1987 and 1990) for a detailed formal discussion. The impact on social 
welfare is the full general equilibrium effect of an extra overall availability of the good (in other 
words, where functions are differentiable, the Lagrange multiplier on the resource balance 
constraint for the good). It will depend on the functioning of the economy, including who gains and 
who loses from the extra availability , and the social weightings attached to those gains and losses – 
distribution matters to the determination of shadow prices. Shadow prices can be very different for 
different availabilities of goods, different times, different model structures and different 
distributional weightings.  
 
The concepts have great usefulness; and we do not have to fall into the common errors described 
below.  But all too many economists and others have fallen and do fall into analytical traps they 
barely recognise.  This is yet another example of the dangers in the economics and ethics of climate 
change of focusing on standard narrow formulations and losing sight of the big issues at stake.  We 
have to look in a careful way, using all the economics we can muster, into intertemporal values in 
imperfect and uncertain economies where the range of possible circumstances is very large and 
future levels and distributions of well-being are strongly influenced by the decisions we take now. 
The Economics 101 treatment of intertemporal issues using models with perfect markets and one 
good at each point of time just does not cut the mustard. 
 
In my view the key choices in policy for climate change are the strategic ones amongst radically 
different emissions paths. In Paper 1 I argued that, based on an understanding of the consequences 
of different emissions paths in terms of the management of risk, there was a powerful case for 
strong and urgent reductions of emissions flows, with an aim of radically reducing probabilities of 
temperature increases of 4oC and above and the great dangers they bring.  Could those strategic 
choices be reached or guided by describing shadow prices, discount factors and the like, starting 
from where we are and gradually making investments guided by those prices? I would suggest that 
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such a process guided by marginal signals would be very unlikely to generate change at the pace 
necessary.  
 
Formally speaking, in models of maximisation, with “well-behaved” functional forms (appropriate 
continuities and convexities which allow marginal conditions to fully characterise an optimum) there 
is a duality between prices and quantities. At a maximum or optimum, the set of shadow prices 
associated with the optimum would imply that any perturbation from that optimum would make a 
loss if evaluated at those prices. In this sense the shadow prices guide us to an optimum, and each 
optimum has an associated set of shadow prices. If functional forms and model structures are 
sufficiently "well-behaved", at a point away from the optimum, if choices are guided by shadow 
prices associated with that point, then the incremental decisions will move us towards the optimum. 
This is the familiar "duality" between prices and qualities in well-behaved models. 
 
However, this context is much more difficult than that, not only technically (probably there are many 
"badly behaved" relationships1), but also in the scale of the risks involved, the scale and nature of 
necessary change and the dangers of delay. The scale of the possible consequences involved, the 
uncertainties, and the time scales make an approach based on shadow prices and integration over a 
sequence of small changes extremely difficult to carry through and potentially very misleading. 
Issues of this scale and temporal sensitivity cannot be convincingly represented as the integral of a 
collection of marginal changes in a static model or where the clock is conceptually stopped whilst 
the tatonnement process edging towards some optimum takes place.  
 
The sensible way forward, in my view, is a strategic analysis of possible actions and consequences 
along the lines described. Implementation will indeed require a strong reliance on markets, 
entrepreneurship and private investment but the strategy has to be drawn on a bigger scale. This is a 
familiar mathematical and practical point. Mathematically, prices and marginal valuations will 
depend on the overall path. Practically, investors will find decisions very difficult if they cannot have 
some confidence in the overall policy direction of travel. 
 
From this point of view an intense focus on discount factors and rates, particular if made the central 
issue, can divert attention from the big strategic issues.  The discount factors and rates will matter to 
                                                          
1
 Many discontinuities and non-convexities are likely to arise in this context. It is probably still more difficult 
than that – it is hard to know what functions and spaces may be at issue. See Drèze and Stern (1987) and (1990) 
for the relationship between shadow prices and the theory of reform: this follows a tradition of Meade, 
Guesnerie and others (see references in those papers).  
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investment programmes, public and private. They will be important to implementation and to the 
calculation of important social costs, including that of carbon. But we must be careful to avoid 
missing the “forest" of the big decisions by looking only at "the trees" of valuing marginal increments. 
This is surely a case where the scale and risks are such that we should start with an examination of 
the overall strategy and see marginal valuations, shadow prices, within that strategic framework. 
Both intertemporal and intragenerational values (particularly pure-time discounting) will influence 
that strategic framework but they are also endogenous to it.2 
 
Unfortunately, in discussions in economics of ethics and climate change, the role of discounting is 
not only over-done, it is badly done. The misleading formulations and mistakes matter not only to 
the diversion from the big picture but also in influencing the important role that discounting should 
play within the implementation of a strategy. The mistakes are closely linked to the attempts to 
shoe-horn the very non-standard set of issues in economics and ethics that are raised by climate 
change, into the standard framework of marginal adjustments. The misleading formulations and 
mistakes matter not only to the subject of climate change but also more generally, for example, in 
framing long-run decisions on infrastructure and on the environment. The rest of Part 1 of the paper 
is devoted to some of the detail.  
 
1.2 Many goods, many people, many states of nature, many discount rates, and many mistakes.  
In order to explain and illustrate the limitations of standard approaches to discounting in this 
context, and the many mistakes which have arisen in relation to climate change, let me look at two 
propositions, each of which is crassly misleading or false in this context.  First, "The question of 
discounting and intertemporal values is basically the same question as the choice of the discount 
rate, or hurdle rate of return, against which all investment projects should be assessed."  Second, 
"We can learn most or all of what we need to know for intertemporal valuations and the choice of 
discount rate in this context from capital markets." 
 
First it should be clear from the definition of discount factors and rates (depending as they do on the 
good in question and on the time being considered) and from the magnitude of potential change 
that anyone who speaks of "the discount rate" in the context of climate change, in the sense that 
there is one rate, constant over time, which should be applied to all investment projects, including 
investing in reducing emissions, should go to the bottom of the class.  It should be clear that to 
formulate the question in this way is to make a collection of serious errors. The detail of an 
                                                          
2
 And see Weitzman (1974) on starting with quantities or prices in problems of risks. 
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appropriate treatment of the issues and the nature and implications of the common errors is 
important.  
 
Let us start with the formal definitions of a discount factor and rate as given above.  If the discount 
factor for good i at time t is it, then the discount rate, it at time t, is the rate of fall of it, i.e. it 
measures how fast the discount factor is falling.  In other words itt measures how much less 
(proportionally) a unit of good i is valued at t+t, relative to good i at time t. In discrete time, if it 
were 0.1 per period, the a unit of good i at time t+1 would be 10% less valuable than at time t. 
     –̇                (1) 
As we have emphasised, 'the discount rate' depends on i and t.  Equation (1) is sometimes said to 
define the ‘own’ discount rate for good i.3 When uncertainty is introduced an index for the ‘state of 
nature’ will be necessary too; alternatively we can interpret goods in different states of nature as 
different so that the index i carries that information (an umbrella when it is raining is deemed a 
different good from when it is dry). 
 
How are own discount rates for goods i and j related?  This is clear from (2), remembering that  and 
 depend on t, 
     -      ̇         re                 (2) 
Thus the difference between the discount rates for goods i and j at time t is equal to the rate at 
which the relative valuation, or relative discount factors, or relative shadow prices4 (we use the 
terms interchangeably for this discussion) are changing. 
 
This type of argument has been familiar in economic theory for at least 60 years (see, e.g. Malinvaud, 
1953, on heterogeneous capital goods) and was generally recognised in the cost-benefit analysis 
literature of the 1960s, 70s and 80s, in the phrase "the discount rate depends on the choice of 
numeraire".5  In other words, if good i is chosen for numeraire we will see a different array of 
discount rates from those which would arise if good j is chosen as numeraire. The choice of 
numeraire should not affect decision-making but it will affect the expression of the social accounting. 
 
                                                          
3
 See, e.g., Bliss, 1975 “Capital Theory and the Distribution of Income” North Holland.  
4
 A formal definition of the shadow price of good i at time t is the increment to social welfare arising from an 
extra unit of good i becoming available at time t. It will be relative shadow prices that matter to decisions. This 
definition of the notion needs some aggregate concept of social welfare or an objective function. See Drèze 
and Stern (1997 and 1990). A shadow price will depend both on the functioning of the model and the 
distributional and other values embodied in the concept of social welfare. 
5
 See, e.g. Little and Mirrlees (1974) or Stern (1972). 
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We would expect   to be influenced by the relative scarcity of i at that time. For example, if i were 
environmental services it is possible that they would become more scarce putting "upward 
pressure" on    over time. It would also be influenced by overall standards of living. If life was 
getting better the overall  levels might fall over time, but if conditions were getting worse they 
might rise. 
 
Similar remarks apply when we recognise that incremental consumption may not have the same 
social value for different groups.  Indeed, it is reasonable to argue that consumption increments for 
different groups will have different social marginal values, unless it is assumed directly, and that 
would seem arbitrary since the supporting ethical judgements are unclear, that they are all deemed 
to have the same value; or unless it can be assumed that an optimum set of lump-sum transfers is in 
place that sets the social marginal valuations to be the same, as a condition of optimality.  The 
availability of such a set of lump-sum transfers is thoroughly implausible, for the usual 
information/incentive reasons which are standard in modern public economics (see e.g. Mirrlees, 
1971, 1996 or 1997). Many would argue that a lower social marginal valuation should be applied to 
an increment to someone who is better off (e.g. under utilitarian or Bergson-Samuelson objectives).6 
The social value of good i, made available at time t, to household h, is      
  where     is the social 
marginal valuation of income to household h in time period t, or the welfare weight for h at time t. It 
would generally vary across households. 
 
Narrow cost-benefit analysis, using standard marginal techniques, of small investment projects, 
which cause minor deviations from a given growth path can be a very useful way of discriminating in 
a practical and reasoned way between different opportunities.  However, in the context of climate 
change, we have seen that there are real possibilities that some (high-carbon) attempted investment 
or growth strategies could lead to immense change in the world’s economic and social 
circumstances, including the possibility of rapid decline, wholesale destruction of the environment, 
radical change in income distribution, and the movement of people on a scale which could result in 
major, widespread and extended conflict and loss of life.  In such a context, it could hardly be argued 
convincingly that discount rates could be treated as constant over time for at least four important 
reasons. First, they would surely be sensitive to possible future income levels, particularly to possible 
                                                          
6
 The concept of the social marginal valuation of income must in any case be used with care since, if market 
and shadow prices differ anywhere in the system, the marginal propensity to pay shadow taxes out of income 
(where shadow taxes are the difference between market prices and shadow prices) should influence the 
marginal conditions for optimum lump-sum taxes, or indeed for second-best optimum taxes.  These issues are 
discussed formally at some length in Drèze and Stern (1987 and 1990). 
 
10 
 
decline, an outcome which could be associated with higher discount factors in the future and 
negative discount rates.  Second, environmental services might collapse on key dimensions, thus it is 
difficult or impossible to make a case that the relative shadow price of such services and 
consumption goods remains constant – discount rates will vary across goods (see equation 2). Third, 
if world income distribution is radically affected, e.g. the poorest are hit earliest and hardest by 
climate change, it cannot be argued that benefits or costs are likely to be spread in a fairly broad and 
stable way, and one which is similar for benefits, for costs, and for the raising of resources: these are 
the kind of arguments necessary if income distribution issues are put to one side. Fourth, 
widespread loss of life would require going outside the standard formulations of a fixed number of 
individuals and the evaluation of consequences only in terms of changes or goods accruing to those 
individuals. 
 
Thus many attempts at presenting action on climate change as just another project to be compared 
with other possible projects, such as building water infrastructure in poor countries, fighting malaria 
and so on (e.g. Lomborg, 2009), are hopelessly flawed because they take no serious account in their 
method of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of the potential radical global changes involved in unmanaged 
climate change and their implications for intertemporal valuation. 
 
Such simple-minded cost-benefit comparisons also usually treat such projects as separate stand-
alone projects with no interactions.  Water issues, diseases and health, and climate change are 
intimately inter-linked and it is a basic mistake in CBA to treat inter-linked projects as separate when 
one is attempting to evaluate them.  Such attempts to shoe-horn a profoundly non-marginal and 
system-wide set of issues into a narrow marginal framework, and in the process overlook the inter-
linkage of projects, appear to involve an ignorance of the basics of the theory and practice of cost-
benefit analysis. Careful analyses of consequences should indeed be at the heart of strategic 
decisions but the narrow forms of CBA sometimes used or proposed ride roughshod over the science 
concerning scale and interlinkage, the economics in terms of the basic theory of evaluation, and the 
philosophy relating the underlying ethical issues.  
  
It is interesting to note that towards the end of one of his papers on discounting, which is largely 
based on approaches involving simple social welfare functions and marginal effects, Dasgupta, who 
has written interestingly and wisely on the principles of project evaluation, concludes that the 
possible vast scale of losses makes such narrow cost-benefit analyses of very limited value (Dasgupta, 
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2008). I agree with him, but this does suggest that focusing heavily or primarily on such approaches 
risks being diversionary for the analysis of inter-temporal values and valuations in this context.   
 
Let me now move from general formulations of underlying principles to a very particular structure 
which focusses on a one-good growth model. It involves a narrow approach to ethics and 
uncertainty and a highly aggregated approach both to consumers and goods. Thus, I do not wish to 
argue that it should occupy centre stage in a discussion of discounting for climate change. However, 
because it is so prominent in discussion of inter-temporal ethics, it is important to set it out explicitly 
so that the problems applying it in this context can themselves be made explicit. We shall see that 
notwithstanding its narrowness, the approach will also have some usefulness in analysing parametric 
formulations of approaches to inter-temporal values and that it can illuminate some of the issues 
around pure-time discounting in infinite horizon models. A core part of this story will be the Ramsey 
analysis or rule for optimum allocation between consumption and investment. 
 
Many formulations of overall objectives in the modelling of intertemporal choices at the national 
level, in standard micro, general equilibrium or growth theory, use a simplified objective expressed 
as the maximisation of the mathematical expectation of the integral of some function of aggregate 
consumption, see for example (3). 
 E∫∑              , t)                       (3) 
The expectation operator E ranges over the space of possible outcomes, the integral is over time, 
and the summation is over individuals (or in many examples in the literature fairly aggregated sub-
groups in the population),   is a social utility function,     is the total consumption (usually one-
good but could be a vector) of group   at a time  , and    is the population of group   at time  . It 
is often assumed that     is equally distributed amongst group h with consumption per head in the 
group     (although other within-group distribution rules are possible). 
 
Whilst this formulation is fairly flexible in terms of the issues it covers, it does embody two 
important and narrow assumptions: it represents attitudes to risk by working with the expectation 
of social utility  ( ), and second, it treats consumption at different points in time as separable.7  The 
vector     could be interpreted as allowing for the role of environmental services but all too often is 
in terms of one-dimension only, aggregate consumption. Whilst not embodied in (3) itself, 
applications often treat the probability distribution of outcomes at different times as independent – 
                                                          
7
 And it assumes an exogenously given structure and time profile of population. 
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that is implausible because if climate turns out, for example, worse than expected8 then the same 
may be more likely to be true of later periods; further, some damages may be irreversible or long-
lasting. See Stern (2013) for an elaboration of this idea.  
 
In order to express in a simple way some of the common discussions of discounting based on this 
approach, let us further simplify the formulation of the social objective (3), as in (4):  
E∫      ) 
                           (4) 
Now we have just one good, there are   households at a time  , with equal consumption
9   , and 
“pure-time discounting” at a constant rate  .  Pure-time discounting here involves a discount factor, 
    , on future utility and attaches a lower weight to future generations or future utility of 
consumption entirely on the grounds that they are in the future: we shall shortly examine some of 
the suggested arguments for so doing.  It can be understood as discounting the lives, and thus 
utilities, of those born later simply on the grounds of date of birth, irrespective of what their 
consumption might be; it is quite explicitly discrimination by date of birth.  
 
In this framework the discount factor at time   is: 
     
 (  ) 
             (5) 
Then   is the marginal valuation of an overall extra unit of total consumption (distributed equally so 
that everyone at   gets an extra    ⁄ ); it is the partial derivative of (4) with respect to      We take 
  equal to one. Then    can be seen as the shadow price of a unit of consumption in time t. In a 
simple optimum growth model the optimality condition for the allocation between consumption and 
investment is that    should be equal to the value of an extra unit of investment or capital. 
 
The social discount rate,    , at time  , is then the rate of fall of  , that is:    
  
   
 
  
 
 
  
                                      (6) 
 
This may be interpreted as the social discount rate – the rate at which the shadow value of a unit of 
consumption falls. Optimality, or the Ramsey rule, would require that this should be equal to the 
social rate of return on investment or the rate at which the shadow value of an extra unit of 
investment falls; in simple cases this will be equal to the social marginal product of capital. The 
                                                          
8
 For example, because climate-sensitivity turned out bigger than expected. 
9
 It is possible to tell a story of a fixed income distribution but we keep it simple. 
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intuition is that on the margin the return to allocating a unit of output to consumption or to 
investment should be the same.10 
 
If    ) takes the special isoelastic form, i.e.         , this becomes: 
            where      ̇  ⁄  at time  .      (7) 
Thus the social discount rate is equal to the elasticity of the marginal utility of income, times the 
growth rate, plus the pure-time discount rate. 
 
The Ramsey formulation which has been widely used, although the narrowness of the assumptions 
used to derive it often get insufficient attention.  We should note immediately in this context that 
we have to recognise that there are circumstances, with substantial probabilities, where    may be 
negative.  Thus, as we have observed already, even in this narrow and often misleading framework 
we are quite likely to find negative discount rates.  
 
The Ramsey formulation was presented and discussed in Appendix 2A of the Stern Review. That 
Appendix also contained warnings about the unreliability of many of the simplifying assumptions: 
including that of one-good in relation to the important environmental services; uncertainty about 
future consumption; the possibility of decline for some individuals; endogenous population, and so 
on. These warnings appear to have been overlooked by many (see e.g. Nordhaus, 2008; Weitzman, 
2007a; IMF 2012 chapter 4). On the other hand, it has some usefulness in crystallising some 
discussions of distributional judgements and some issues around infinite horizons, as we shall see 
below. 
 
1.3 Attempts to base discounting on markets 
The above discussion has already gone much of the way to explaining why it makes little sense in 
this context to try to derive implied social values for policy on climate change from market 
observations of rates of interest or return.  Such attempts generally involve a whole series of 
mistakes.  I set them out explicitly here because it is remarkable how tempting such a procedure has 
sometimes appeared to be (see e.g. Nordhaus, 2008; Weitzman, 2007a; IMF, 2012 chapter 4) in the 
context of climate change. I should note, however, that both Bill Nordhaus and Marty Weitzman are 
                                                          
10
 In formal analysis of necessary conditions for optimal growth following Pontryagin or Lagrangean methods, 
the Ramsey rule plays the role of the differential equation for shadow prices. The capital accumulation 
condition (consumption plus investment is equal to output) gives the differential equation on quantities. The 
transversality condition on long-run value of capital is discussed below. For a discussion of sufficient conditions 
for optimum growth, see Stern (1974). 
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changing their approach in the light of an enhanced focus on just how big the effects of climate 
change could be (see e.g. Nordhaus, 2011; Weitzman, 2011). 
 
Interestingly, 6% has occasionally seemed a popular11 choice for “discount rates”: supporting 
arguments, which are mistaken as we shall argue, are sometimes based on medium- to long-term 
returns in rich countries (primarily USA) on risky financial assets such as shares.  Assuming such a 
rate were to be applied over 50 and 100 years it would mean a unit of benefit being valued 50 years 
from now eighteen times lower than now and for 100 years, 339 times lower than now. It comes 
close to saying “forget about issues concerning 100 years or more from now”, an ethical conclusion 
which is so strong that its validity requires examination. That is why it is so important to show how 
mistaken this approach can be.  
 
The assertion that discount rates in this context, that is appropriate for application to long-run 
climate issues, can be derived directly from observed market rates of interest or return, can include 
some or all of the following errors. Some derive from implicit underlying modelling assumptions 
concerning the nature of growth or decline across many dimensions of goods and people, and others 
basic problems with the functioning and existence of markets. 
 
Problems arising from underlying modelling assumptions 
 Extrapolations from past rates of return involve the assumption that the past circumstances, 
including economic growth rates, for which those rates of return had applied will continue in 
a fairly similar manner into the medium and long-term future.  That assumption cannot be 
remotely plausible when the analysis of choice over climate change must cover the real 
possibility that in some circumstances the effects will be so severe (as described in Paper 1) 
as to generate great damage to livelihoods, severe dislocation for many, major conflict and 
substantial loss of life.  In circumstances where future generations may be substantially 
worse off than ourselves there would be a powerful case (and see below), for discount 
factors (for the associated consumption good) less than one (extra units at some time in the 
future are seen as more valuable than now) and thus, over some periods for negative 
discount rates. 
 The possible devastation of the natural environment by climate change indicates the 
possibility that the discount rate with environmental services as the numeraire could be 
negative.  If we have a postulated a high discount rate, possibly market derived and however 
                                                          
11
 For example, Weitzman (in 2007a) argued for 6% as consistent with a “trio of twos”. Growth rate at 2% 
pure-time discount rate at 2% and   = 2 – see equation (7). 
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mistaken that may be, with aggregate consumption as numeraire we must allow the 
possibility of a rapidly increasing relative price of environmental goods, potentially at a rate 
much faster than the discounting.  In practice this increasing relative price is likely to be 
forgotten.  
 There is a potential for sharp deterioration in the distribution of income as a result of 
climate change – with the poorest being hit earliest and hardest.  Thus taking a numeraire 
for discounting as aggregate consumption, whilst ignoring changes in income distribution, is 
likely to be misleading. Whilst relative welfare weights     might, or might not, be set at 
t = 0, their changes may well be overlooked. 
Problems arising from functioning of markets 
 Capital markets, particularly for the long term, have a whole host of familiar imperfections 
concerned with asymmetric information (including moral hazard and adverse selection), 
market manipulation, limited ability to carry risk by different parties, and so on. In these 
circumstances, the standard arguments that they reveal relevant marginal rates of 
transformation or substitution over time are weak. 
 There is no substantial financial or other market that applies to collective decision-making 
over a century or two.  Markets deal mostly with individual decisions over relatively short-
term scales; the high end of time scales is perhaps 2 or 3 decades for mortgages or 4 or 5 
decades for pensions.  Thus the markets which might (if we forgot about the many other 
serious problems with the argument) give us guidance are not there. 
 
Suppose we obstinately persisted in an attempt to derive discount rates for social evaluation in this 
context, notwithstanding these serious errors or problems, what would we find if we tried to get as 
close as we could to a relevant discount rate?  Whilst I think it provides only limited guidance for the 
reasons already described, the closest one we could find in the markets would probably be the 
“riskless” real rates on long-run government bonds.  These are the longest-term amongst the 
options which might be available to individuals.  Note that it is the riskless rate (nothing, of course, is 
completely riskless) that is relevant here since in most of the specific formulations in terms of an 
overall societal objective (see below and (3) above), risk is usually handled separately by taking 
expectations.  Such rates for the UK and USA have generally been around 1.5% or so over 50 years, 
hugely different from 6% (see e.g. data and analysis in Barclays, 2011). Interestingly Weitzman 
(2007b) points out that the reason this may be so far below the long-run six per cent on shares is the 
substantial riskiness in the shares, particularly in terms of “weight in tails”; this is an important 
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argument, interesting in its own right, but which appears to implicitly accept a riskless rate around 
1.5%. 
 
A common and longstanding line of argument on discounting in project appraisal is to use “the 
opportunity cost of funds”. This is based on rates of return to investment on the grounds that, 
through the production process a unit of investment can be turned to (1 + r) next period if r is the 
rate of return. In this argument the discount factor would be (1/1 + r) and the discount rate r. 
 
This is clearly to use “free investible funds” as the numéraire in defining the discount factor (see, e.g. 
Little and Mirrlees, 1974). For a recent discussion in this context, see Gollier (2012) or Posner and 
Weisbach (2010). Investment is not an obviously useful numéraire for this context of possible long-
term dislocation and where the questions at issue refer to major damage to individuals. One way of 
expressing the approach implicit in adopting this numeraire and "hurdle rate" would be to say that 
we can make "standard investments" reap the returns that market rates indicate, and "buy-down" 
any climate damage resulting from climate inaction.  
 
However, this line of argument suffers from many of the same problems described above. Long-term 
rates of return on investment might be negative in an environment where capital goods could be 
destroyed or where the investment process itself could have strong negative externalities in the 
damage it might cause. Shorter-term market rates might be poor guides to these longer-term, and 
possibly negative, rates. Further, the future prices of "buying-down" environmental damage may be 
much higher than we anticipate now. 
 
A recent high-profile paper by Arrow et al. (2013) recommends declining discount rates (DDR) for 
the United States, a procedure adopted in practice by the UK and France, in the context of long-term 
projects, including climate change and environmental issues. It also contrasts the discount rates 
based on using consumption and investment as numeraire. It treats the problem in large measure as 
one of uncertainty over discount rates. The broad conclusion of DDR is a step in a sensible direction. 
In bringing in uncertainty over discount rates, they contrast a 1% rate, such as we might see in long-
term bond markets, and 7% market rates of return on (risky) private investment. They argue that if 
the two rates are equally likely then an equivalent path of year-to-year discounts rate giving the 
same expected net present value would show DDR. 
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All this is broadly sensible as far as it goes, and in the context of crude aggregate public discount 
rates. But it does not go far enough and it does not start from the right theoretical foundations. On 
the former, the major uncertainty is over outcomes and future generations could be worse off. The 
paper argues correctly that the reason for standard approaches to discounting is that future 
generations are likely to be better off but then it fails to bring in properly the key uncertainties 
which are over future standards of living. On the second, they do not go back to the original basics of 
the theory of shadow prices on which discounting is based. Thus, they lose the key points about 
multiple goods and changes in their shadow values, and fail to identify properly the issues around 
choosing consumption and investment as numeraire as described above. It is not “which to choose” 
that is the question; it is understanding that they are different numeraires and choosing the one 
which helps us better to deal with the issues. Here those issues concern possible dramatic effects on 
consumption and lives and the investment numeraire is less helpful. 
 
1.4 Attempting to specify or infer distributional values 
Let us return to the narrow framework of the one-good model and the expression for the social 
discount rate in (6) and (7): in particular, in that context we discuss possible ethical approaches to 
the specification of the ‘parameters’   and   in equation (7). The formulation captures some issues 
of distributional judgements and pure-time preference in a clear and stark way; it is widely adopted 
and it is important to see how discussion over the choice of   and    might be articulated and which 
arguments might be robust. Further, whilst the discount rate formula (7) does depend on the 
particular, and rather narrow, model structure, the principles and issues it embodies are more 
general. Pure-time discounting is discrimination by date of birth, and is a much more general notion 
than a particular form in the analysis preceding (7). Similarly, social values arise from discussions of 
the role of relative consumption, income or wealth in valuing relative increments to different people 
which are more general than, but reflected in, discussions of the particular iso-elastic form 
embodied in (7). 
 
For each of   and    ‘thought experiments’ can be useful.  We take   first in this section and   in the 
next.  If I were to take   as 2, then I would value an extra unit to person A, who has consumption one 
fifth that of B, 25 times as much as an extra unit to B; if   were 1 then 5 times as much (see the 
specification of the isoelastic form of utility following equation (6).12 Such thought experiments are 
                                                          
12
 The isoelastic form (and only this form) has the feature that these relative marginal valuations depend only 
on relative incomes.  Some, such as Serge Kolm, have questioned this feature on the grounds that we might 
worry little about distribution of income amongst the rich, even if some of the rich were a good deal richer 
than the others. See, e.g. Kolm (1969) "The optimum production of social justice". 
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sometimes expressed in terms of a “leaky bucket” and this is a metaphor widely used in both 
economics and philosophy (e.g. Okun, 1975, Stern, 1977, and Atkinson and Brandolini, 2010, in 
economics; Broome, 2009, and Page, 2007, in philosophy). In the example for B with consumption 5 
times of A we could ask whether we would make a marginal transfer from B to A even if four fifths of 
it were lost on the way. If the answer is “yes” then   is larger than 1. Such a discussion can directly 
inform a choice of  .  
 
There have been various attempts to try to assemble evidence from some public or collective 
decisions involving distributional judgements in such a way as to throw light on what   might 
summarise the values behind such decisions.  To infer values from decisions in a formal way we have 
to consider an “inverse optimum” problem: for an observed decision, we ask what values (here  ) in 
the objective function would be consistent with that decision.  A great difficulty with this approach is 
that, for it to be usefully informative on the implied ethical position, we have to have a plausible 
description of what is in the mind, or collective minds, of the decision-maker(s).  And in the latter 
case we have to argue that the decision of a collective, community or nation can be plausibly 
modelled as if it were a single optimiser.   
 
When we model policy problems as if they involve maximisation of some objective, we specify the 
constraints and incentive structures assumed or perceived by the policy maker. For example, we 
have to make assumptions in discussing the setting of taxes, concerning how people react to higher 
or lower taxes.  All of us who have worked in this area of formal public economics know how difficult 
it is to write down plausible descriptions of reactions by individuals to tax or transfer changes, or in 
other words the structure of incentives or disincentives.  
 
Stern (1977) and Atkinson and Brandolini (2010) have provided fairly extensive reviews of 
tax/transfer “evidence on  ”, at more than three decades apart.  They both conclude that there is a 
huge range of possibilities depending on the case studies used and assumptions made about 
perceived technologies, constraints and incentives.  There are many examples of proposed social 
values, where   would be close to zero – many people appear to think that a dollar of purchasing 
power or income has the same value wherever it may be: Al Harberger famously argued, in 
discussing cost-benefit analysis in seminars in Oxford that I attended in the late 1960s, that “a dollar 
is a dollar is a dollar”, on the grounds that it can be moved around.13  Atkinson and Brandolini (2010) 
point out there are examples where an attempt to use an inverse optimum problem to “explain” 
                                                          
13
 That, of course, abstracts from or ignores all the problems of asymmetric information (the taxpayer knows 
much that the government does not) which motivate the theory of income taxation à la Mirrlees. 
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income transfer policies could make it look as if   were negative: cases where policies essentially 
transfer resources from poorer to richer.  
 
Some discussions of the problem of inferring η have been based on individuals or collective savings. 
Dasgupta 2008, for example, appeals to certain simple aggregative savings models without technical 
progress and concludes that   should be at least 2.  But again we find acute sensitivity of the 
estimate to model assumptions. In savings models for example, if we assume exogenous technical 
progress, then we will have a far lower ‘optimum’ savings rate for a given η than without: see for 
example, Mirrlees and Stern (1972), Stern (2008), De Long (2006), Dasgupta (2007).  Thus to “explain” 
a savings rate of 30-40% we could infer η equal to 1 or 1.5 with exogenous technical progress or η 
equal 3-4 without.14 For further discussion of the role of such technical progress in inferring values, 
see the next sub-section on pure-time discounting. 
 
A further attempted route at “  inferral” has been associated with standard models of choice under 
uncertainty where in expected utility frameworks,   is the index of relative risk aversion (constant in 
this case).15  In that context we can again find  ’s that range from negative to very large: there are 
many who accept unfair gambles (thus a convex utility function over some range and, in this 
framework, negative  ) and others who appear very risk-averse for some decisions (high  ).  We 
should note, however, that the expected utility model appears to perform badly as a vehicle for 
understanding many individual decisions (see e.g. Ariely, 2008; Slovic, 2010; Kahneman and Tversky, 
2000).16  Thus the risk/uncertainty route does not offer much help either in attempts to pin down   
via an appeal to inverse optimum approaches.  Nevertheless it seems to remain attractive to some. 
(Barro 2013) has recently claimed that analysis of the “equity premium” in portfolio analysis tells 
him that   is around 3. Weitzman (2007) appeared confident 2 was a reasonable specification for  . 
Interestingly, Weitzman (2009) has shown that the equity premium equity can be understood in 
terms of strong weight in the tails on equities, i.e. results are strongly influenced by assumptions on 
the underlying distribution of random variables. Such discussions illustrate that an estimate is very 
sensitive to assumptions about what is in the mind of the decision-maker even if, in the case of 
uncertainty, we claim that the expected utility model, or other such model, is a good one. A further 
                                                          
14
 Actually, the technical progress does not have to be exogenous. Similar results would follow from 
endogenous long-run technical progress. 
15
 This means, if the model involves the maximisation of expected utility that an individual would be willing to 
pay, the same proportion of wealth, , to insure against a given proportional loss, ,regardless of the level of 
income. In other words,  depends on , but not on income. 
16
 The many difficulties are compounded if we distinguish along Knightian lines, between uncertainty where 
probabilities cannot readily be specified and risk where they can be, see Stern Review, 2007, pp.38-39.   
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major ethical leap is involved if, in the case of uncertainty, we try to pass from individual decisions 
under uncertainty to social decision making. The relevance of the former for the latter has to be 
reasoned and it is not at all clear. That problem is less severe if the inferral is from the modelling of 
government decisions.  
 
In the models often used in the context of climate change   can perform three functions; (i) for 
modelling choice under uncertainty, (ii) for modelling intratemporal distributional issues, and (iii) for 
modelling intertemporal distributional issues. This is surely "too much" for one parameter, itself 
located in one particular utilitarian structure. Treating the issues separately but consistently is an 
important subject for research with applications beyond climate change. The multiple roles of η in 
analyses of growth, inequality and risk aversion is illustrated by the effects of higher η in the context 
of growth and risk in some of the calculations associated with the Stern Review and subsequent 
discussion. If impacts of climate change involve great risk, a higher η will place greater weights on 
future risks, but a higher η will place lower weight on the future if underlying growth of incomes is 
assumed. An illustration of the interaction of these growth and uncertainty effects is provided in the 
Stern Review (Technical Appendix to Postscript, Stern, 2007). With underlying growth and some 
given assumptions on the riskiness of the future, a higher η gives higher implied (proportional) costs 
of climate change because it involves greater aversion to risk, but if the future is taken as less risky a 
higher η gives lower implied costs of climate change, because its greater aversion to inequality puts 
less weight on benefits to future generations and thus heavier discounting.17 
 
With the huge range and great sensitivity of estimates to assumptions, we should beware taking 
strong positions on what   is revealed to be or should be. However some such as Dasgupta (claiming 
  should be well above 2) (see Dasgupta, 2008) and Layard (  around 1) (see Layard, 2005 and 2008) 
have been willing to do so. We have already noted that Barro appears convinced it is around 3. In 
the Stern Review 2007 from the UK Treasury we focussed on   equal to 1 as an “official position” 
(see “Green Book” the Treasury’s handbook on project appraisal18). That a number is “official” does 
not by itself add greatly to its credibility as an attractive ethical standpoint. We did offer some 
sensitivity analysis to   in the Stern Review (see Technical Appendix to Postcript, Stern, 2007). 
 
There is a separate question here on what the status of a value for   might be in an ethical argument 
even if we found that many distributional social decisions (whether intra or intertemporal) could be 
"explained" by some given value of  .  Would that level of   be compelling as a way of capturing 
                                                          
17
 See also the discussion around Table 2 in Stern (2008). 
18
 See: http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/data_greenbook_index.htm 
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values for climate decisions?  That is not entirely clear.  I note here only that estimates of  ’s in 
inverse optimum problems are "all over the place" and thus offer little guidance.19 
 
Some might argue that it would be better to avoid all the  -inferral discussion, whether or not it 
gives clear results, and ask directly about values in relation to the climate problem at hand. In my 
view that is too sweeping. Distributional values do matter greatly and are not easy to characterise. 
Thus it sometimes helps to think these values through in a structured way in simple tightly defined 
circumstances in order to reflect on them and understand them better. One can then ask whether 
those thought processes can help us in setting values for a more complex problem. 
 
I have already expressed the view that, for climate change, with its huge range of possible outcomes, 
many of them potentially extremely difficult or catastrophic, the expected utility one-good 
framework can have only a minor role in the argument. It can give some useful insights but we 
should not overly focus on it.  An economic approach to the problem, which grapples in a way that 
recognises the magnitude of the scientific and ethical issues at stake, which has to look at many 
dimensions of outcomes, outcomes where people can be much poorer than now, where there is loss 
of life, where there are very different impacts across the income spectrum, where there is loss of 
biodiversity and so on, was described in Paper 1.   
 
Distributional values involve difficult ethical questions and with climate change they are particularly 
severe and can involve catastrophic outcomes and loss of life on a major scale. Such questions 
require open discussion. That explicit ethical discussion should be set in the context of analytical 
frameworks appropriate to the problem and not confined to narrow formulations simply on the 
grounds that we are familiar with them.  
 
1.5 Pure-time discounting 
The specification of a pure-time discount rate (  in the simplest form in equations (4)-(7)) raises 
questions which go way beyond that particular narrow formulation, and are of a different nature to 
those concerning   which focus on how relative incomes might influence welfare weights. In 
discussing pure-time discounting we focus on how we treat the status of different lives in an ethical 
analysis, rather than on the allocation of livelihoods.  The questions concern a set of issues of great 
significance: the ethical relations between the decisions of this generation and their consequences 
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 See also Stanton (2011) for a discussion of using Negishi weights, which essentially stop the Integrated 
Assessment Models from trying to redistribute income to poorer people at any one moment in time.  
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for the circumstances and well-being of the following generations.  We must recognise, of course, 
that many of those who would be radically affected 50 to 100 years from now by our current 
decisions are not abstract, possible, future lives: many of these people are already with us. 
Generations overlap.  How can we discuss views concerning these profoundly important ethical 
issues? 
 
If we take the simple formulation of the objective as an expectation, (3), or the still simpler version 
(4), we can see what might appear as discrimination by date of birth as actually counting generations 
equally but allowing for some probability of exogenous annihilation of the world, or at least 
exogenous to decisions on climate change. If survival were an issue, we might weight the 
contribution of the social utility at time   by the probability of the world not being annihilated by 
then.  If annihilation, think of it say as a meteor, arrives20 in period   to      with probability    , 
then the probability of survival to   is     .  That is a clear and understandable reason for a 
formulation that looks like "pure-time discounting", which might command wide agreement.   
 
But discounting the welfare of future generations beyond that reason, in the context of using a 
formulation of an objective as in (3), looks like discrimination simply because of date of birth. We 
would not be doing it because of doubts about existence: that has already been covered in the 
arguments just made.  And it is quite separate from marginal valuations which depend on the level 
of consumption or wealth: that comes into the social utility or welfare at date    and is covered in 
the utility function, u( ), in simple cases.  We are concerned here with the discounting of welfare 
itself, in other words, discounting lives.  
 
Continuing to stay in the context just described, there seem to be three types of argument, beyond 
that of the probability of existence, which are on offer as attempts to justify pure-time discounting: 
(i) moral behaviour should prioritise those closer to us; (ii) people actually do not seem to care about 
future generations as much as their own and that tells us what their moral position actually is; (iii) 
technically we get into problems of incompleteness of orderings or non-convergent integrals in 
expressions of objectives in standard forms in economics such as (3) or (4) if we do not allow pure-
time discounting, or if it is very low. None of these, in my view, hold water. 
 
The first argument has often been associated with David Hume of the “Scottish Enlightenment” in 
the 18th century; of course, just because a great philosopher has taken a position does not itself 
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 This is essentially the first event in a Poisson process in this model. 
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make that position compelling.  In developing this first argument one could suggest that much of 
moral behaviour is, or should be based, in and defined by family life and those closest to us, and that 
any understanding of good behaviour must start there. A functional or evolutionary underpinning 
might be involved in the sense that it could be argued that societies where people devote 
themselves first to family can function better or survive better than those where they do not.  But 
arguments concerning better functioning of a society or higher probabilities of survival of a group 
seem to have minimal functional or evolutionary relevance to the question of how far to imperil the 
whole planet – that is more like a one-shot game.   
 
However, a more careful reading21 of Hume indicates that he was well aware of the problems of 
individuals' impatience and that he saw “governors and rulers” as being needed to overcome them, 
as these excerpts from "Of the origin of government" illustrate (Hume, 1739).  In discussing 'my' 
resolution to do the right thing ('prefer the greater good') twelve months hence, he notes that as I 
approach that time:  
"A new inclination to the present good springs up, and makes it difficult for me to adhere 
inflexibly to my first purpose and resolution. This natural infirmity I may very much regret, and 
I may endeavour, by all possible means, to free myself from it. I may have recourse to study 
and reflection within myself; to the advice of friends; to frequent meditation, and repeated 
resolution: And having experienc'd how ineffectual all these are, I may embrace with pleasure 
any other expedient, by which I may impose a restraint upon myself, and guard against this 
weakness" (p. 536-537).  
And a few lines later, he continues: 
"Here then is the origin of civil government and society. Men are not able radically to cure, 
either in themselves or others, that narrowness of soul, which makes them prefer the present 
to the remote. They cannot change their natures. All they can do is to change their situation, 
and render the observance of justice the immediate interest of some particular persons, and 
its violation their more remote. These persons, then, are not only induced to observe those 
rules in their own conduct, but also to constrain others to a like regularity, and enforce the 
dictates of equity thro' the whole society" (p. 537). 
 
It seems that, far from asserting the moral significance and ethical attraction of pure-time 
discounting, Hume was arguing the opposite.  And, like Rawls and Sen, he emphasised the 
importance of seeking a greater objectivity and morality through a more remote decision-making 
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 I am very grateful to Cameron Hepburn for drawing this to my attention. 
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process which promotes the 'greater good', which treats the future with less apparent impatience or 
disdain, and sees the possibility (perhaps optimistic) of "civil magistrates, Kings and their ministers, 
our governors and rulers" as performing that function (Hume, 1739).  It is clear that in his view 
decision-making for the collective good is very different from narrow individual decision-making. 
Thus Hume marshals powerful arguments against pure-time discounting.22 
 
The second argument, i.e. “that’s the way people are” is also deeply flawed in my view.  In trying to 
understand ethical issues and identify ethical criteria and responses we often examine with one 
another, key questions and principles.  We do this to try to inform a discussion and to help public 
reasoning (Sen's language).23  It would seem strange to say that group decisions must be taken, 
implicitly or explicitly, by some sort of vote or diktat which is uninformed by any attempt to reason 
together on the issues at hand.  If that discussion is indeed opened, as it should be in my view, then 
we should try to identify what principles should and can be of help and arguments that might be 
considered.  John Stuart Mill (1909, first published 1848) in particular has reminded us of the 
importance of discussion in shaping our views: public reasoning does not simply concern facts and 
mechanisms but also helps in shaping our understanding of values (Mill, 1909).  That is a tradition for 
which Sen has argued powerfully in a number of contexts, including in "The Idea of Justice" (2009). 
Perhaps even worse is an argument that says this generation has an unfettered right to impose its 
own views on future generations and damage their environment in any way it thinks appropriate 
having taken account of how much it happens to value their well-being. That would be the 
consequence of saying that the right thing is whatever current voters decide. Would we think it right 
that we knowingly harm children in pursuit of current pleasure? Then why would we think it right to 
knowingly harm their prospects?  
 
A third argument has tempted some economists. It arises in one class of mathematical formulations 
and models and is generally associated with a tendency of such models to produce very high savings 
rates or recommendations for (possibly indefinite) consumption postponement. Specifically we find 
that in some of these models an infinite integral over time diverges unless we assume a substantial 
pure-time discount rate. In a simple neo-classical growth model with growth rate, n, of population, N, 
and exogenous labour-augmenting technical progress at rate, α, it is easy to see (by examining the 
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 It would be interesting to speculate, as Christopher Bliss has remarked in a private communication, how far 
Hume would have seen other parts of the world as having important "weight".  Some in the enlightened era 
might have optimistically supposed that nations, as they "learn", would become more similar and "one of us"; 
they might have supposed that until they do they have less importance. Not an argument that would attract all 
of us now, from the perspective of common humanity, even if it might have been relevant then. 
23
 Sen, 2006 and 2009. 
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integrand  (
 
 
)     , where C is total consumption and N is population) that convergence of the 
infinite integral requires:24 
                   (8) 
This same inequality guarantees that      tends to zero, the "transversality condition" for optimum 
growth, i.e. that the shadow value of the stock of capital should tend to zero.25 The intuition is that if 
the shadow value of the capital stock diverges we would effectively be accumulating capital 
inefficiently or postponing indefinitely: the social value of capital at time T is the future utility stream 
it can yield and, with convergence, that present social value should decrease. It is an analogous 
argument to that which applies in a finite horizon model, we would try to use up everything by the 
end of the period. See, e.g. Stern (1974) for a discussion of necessary and sufficient conditions for 
optimality in such models. 
 
The Ramsey rule (see discussion of equations (6) and (7)) for optimality tells us that the long-run 
marginal product of capital and the long-run social discount rate,     , tend to equality. Note also 
that the marginal product of capital which maximises steady-state consumption per head is equal to 
the rate of growth,26 (n). If condition (8) were to fail, then the Ramsey rule would take us in the 
long run to marginal products below and capital stocks above the levels which maximise long-run 
consumption per head. In other words, we would be inefficiently building up excess capital: the only 
paths satisfying the Ramsey rule, a necessary condition for optimality, would be inefficient. And they 
would fail to satisfy the transversality condition. The failure of (8) implies that no optimum exists. If 
    a higher  makes existence and convergence more likely because the discounting effect on 
the left-hand side of (8) is then larger than the effect through the marginal product of capital on the 
right-hand side.  
 
In the case of divergence of the integral, the intertemporal optimisation, here embodied in the 
Ramsey rule, is constantly pointing to postponement. As parameter values take us closer to the 
divergence boundary (equality in (8)) we will see higher savings rates emerging as ‘optimum’. Some 
take this as an ethical argument for strong pure-time discounting.  In other words they use an 
"inverse optimum” approach: we do not see such high savings rates therefore people or societies 
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 In the long run, N grows at rate n, utility of consumption per head at (1- ) and the sum of these two rates 
must be less than   for convergence of the infinite integral.  And see Stern (2007) Chapter 2A. 
25
 Asymptotically,  falls at rate     from (7) since  is the long-run rate of growth of consumption per head 
and K grows at rate n. For convergence of K the former must exceed the latter. 
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 With a production function F(K,Ne
t
) writing  ̂          and  ̂         we have in steady-state when  ̂ 
and  ̂ are constant  ̂   ( ̂)    ) ̂. Maximisation of  ̂ with respect to  ̂ gives   ( ̂)      ), where 
   )       ). 
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must have high pure-time discount rates – they have "revealed their values". Or, some have argued, 
such very high saving would penalise current generations heavily and therefore there may be 
something ethically wrong with the assumption of low or zero pure-time discounting. Thus, 
"oversaving", "divergence of integrals", "incompleteness of ordering" (see below), and non-existence 
of an optimum are very closely related. 
 
But these problems might be telling us something about the perceived structure of the model, for 
example, that the perceived long-run rate of technical progress should be high; the term   on the 
left-hand side of (8) is discounting that arises from the combination of growth, , and the inequality 
aversion parameter,  . Or pointing to higher  . Or it may be suggesting that the whole model 
structure, including the framework of an infinite integral, is misleading.  Whilst horizons may be long 
are they really infinite in the formal sense we use in the mathematics? And the centrality of 
condition (8), which compares long-run social discount rates with long-run growth rates, should 
remind us this approach is unlikely to tell us much about pure-time discounting: in the context of 
climate change we are really very unsure about what long-run growth rates of population might be 
and we have little idea of what long-run exogenous technical process might be when the physical 
environment may change radically. They could both be negative. Indeed, the whole idea of 
exogenous growth in this context is implausible (see Stern, 2013).27  
 
There are genuine arguments concerning why we do not postpone consumption an indefinitely long 
time into the future, including the possibilities of extinction and of technical progress ( could be the 
result of endogenous technical progress). Divergence or otherwise of integrals does not illuminate 
the issues greatly. Note also that we do not show a willingness to pay an infinite sum to reduce the 
probability of a large number of deaths.  Neither does such a willingness seem to be demanded by a 
consequentialist code of ethics.  Indeed, it would make many of our decisions very difficult to assess 
and manage.  Generally, we know that there are many mathematical and other paradoxes 
associated with various formulations of the idea of infinity and they do not necessarily throw great 
light on intertemporal values.28 
 
A fourth and related argument is based on an axiomatic approach to intertemporal welfare 
evaluation. There is a useful recent review in Asheim (2010); see also the book by Blackorby et al. 
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 See also Stern Review, 2007, Appendix to Ch. 2, for some further discussion. 
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 Infinity can open possibilities for a Pareto improvement by bringing consumption forward. In an overlapping 
generations model, the first generation can be made better off by a gift from the second, which can be 
compensated by a gift from the third, and so on. 
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(2005). This literature draws heavily on the early piece by Diamond (1965). Diamond29  examines 
utility streams in an infinite horizon framework. He shows that the assumption of both “equal 
treatment” (in the sense of a time re-ordering of a finite number of utilities being neutral) and 
“sensitivity” (higher utility at any time point increases welfare) is inconsistent with a preference 
ordering which is complete and continuous. He was considering an individual assessing different 
infinite streams of instantaneous utilities but the result naturally carries over to the case of social 
welfare functions and the social evaluation of the utilities of a stream of future generations. These 
are essentially the results examined in a series of papers on social evaluation by Basu and Mitra (e.g. 
2003, 2007), which is driven by the same logic as the Diamond result (with some strengthening of 
the theory). In the case of social evaluation, the assumption of "equal treatment" (also called "finite 
anonymity") rules out pure-time discounting, and "sensitivity" corresponds to the assumption that a 
Pareto improvement increases social welfare. 
 
What goes wrong, in the sense of absence of completeness of an ordering, concerns the ranking of 
the infinite temporal tail, which behaves like a divergent integral. Essentially trying to compare 
divergent integrals is trying to rank infinities of the same order and that can lead to incompleteness 
(unless we are dealing with different orders of infinity such as aleph 0, 1, 2, etc., which is not the key 
point here). 30  
 
Some might be tempted to say that we have to abandon the assumption of ‘equal treatment’ and go 
for pure-time discounting (discrimination by date of birth), thus getting convergent integrals, if the 
discounting is strong enough, and a complete ranking. But this argument appears arbitrary. If a 
collection of assumptions is inconsistent, and you seek a consistent set, which one(s) do you drop? 
Amartya Sen has made this point over many years in his discussion of social choice theory (1970a 
and 1970b, for example) and it is a clear theme in his recent book, “The Idea of Justice”, Sen (2009). 
And as Diamond argues (private communication, July 2013), “The goal is to answer a policy question. 
If a good criterion answers the question (compares the relevant alternatives), that is the end of the 
story. If the criterion does not answer the question, one needs further thought”. For example, 
incompleteness relative to some parts of the domain of choice does not invalidate a criterion. 
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 This builds on Koopmans (1960) and Diamond attributes the observation to Menahem Yaari. 
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 One can attempt to rank divergent integrals using an "overtaking criteria", see, e.g., Asheim, 2010, for 
literature references. But this can deal with the problems only when the integrals are on the "borderline" of 
divergence: in the simple one-good growth framework when the inequality in (8) holds with equality (see, e.g., 
Mirrlees and Stern, 1972, or Stern, 1974). 
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Asheim et al. (2010) makes an interesting point in this context when he shows, with a ‘condition of 
immediate productivity’, that the (strong) Pareto and finite anonymity axioms imply that generation 
by generation, utility should be non-decreasing, in other words be sustainable in the formal sense 
defined in Paper 1. In the context of climate change and a potentially destructive environment we 
cannot assume that in all circumstances all investment can be productive. Capital and other stocks 
can be destroyed and thus returns on investment may be negative.  
 
This line of argument based on investigating the consistency or otherwise of sets of axioms for 
integrated social choice is interesting and valuable. But it does not tell us that we should 
discriminate by date of birth simply on the grounds that some sets of assumptions lead to divergent 
integrals and incomplete orderings.  
 
Interestingly, the rejection of pure-time discounting has been frequent amongst many economists 
who have thought carefully about this issue.  Frank Ramsey (a philosopher and mathematician, as 
well as an economist) described pure-time discounting as “…defective imagination…”.  Roy Harrod 
and John Maynard Keynes agreed.31  So too have some of the great economists of recent times such 
as Bob Solow or James Mirrlees, and the philosopher and economist Amartya Sen.  They have seen 
no strong reason why we should discriminate across generations by date of birth and thus have seen 
no reason for pure-time discounting. Allowing for the probability of existence gives rise to a similar 
formality but it is a different ethical issue.  Of course, counting heads of proponents, even if very 
distinguished, is not necessarily a good way to evaluate an argument, but it does suggest that low or 
zero pure-time discounting is a considered position and not some capriciousness, regal edict, or 
assertion without explanation.  
 
It is, however, the arguments that matter.  I have tried to show that attempts to justify pure-time 
discounting as a moral position generally flounder when scrutinised carefully. It is those who try to 
argue that high pure-time discounting is somehow “pragmatic” that do the “asserting”, without 
robust or sound and reasoned justification. They generally (apart from invoking a weak position 
often wrongly attributed to Hume, who actually refutes it) appeal to one of two arguments: (a) 
people just do it (i.e. exhibit impatience); (b) some models ‘go wrong’ in terms of strange 
conclusions if we make, together with other ethical assumptions and some structural assumptions in 
the model, the further assumption that pure-time discounting is zero or low. The former surely has 
weak ethical status since it is rarely a considered response to an ethical question. The latter, as we 
                                                          
31
 Ramsey (1928); Harrod (1948). 
29 
 
have argued, should be seen as saying that there may be something wrong or missing from the 
models, or problems with other ethical assumptions, rather than necessarily implying strong 
statements about pure-time discounting; and we have gone further and shown that the assumptions 
concerning growth and decline and how they are endogenous to our choices may be critical 
assumptions for scrutiny. So too would be the heavy emphasis on taking literally the mathematical 
formulation of infinity. And if the "problem" that "goes wrong" is incompleteness, that may be 
something we can or should live with. 
 
Low or zero pure-time discounting on the other hand is derived from consistent application of 
ethical principles which are transparent and widely used and explained in broader contexts than 
climate change. Equality of treatment, non-discrimination, under the law and in connection with 
human rights is basic to many constitutional or legal structures. Harsanyi (1953 and 1955) embodies 
the idea in his “impersonality” principle as does Rawls in his “Veil of Ignorance”. Low or zero pure-
time discounting simply applies the idea to date of birth (see also Quiggin, 2012, for a formal proof 
in standard models with social welfare functions and overlapping generations, that equal treatment 
of those currently alive at any point in time requires zero pure-time discounting).  
 
Putting the analysis of the one-good growth model together with the axiomatic treatment of 
Diamond, Basu-Mitra, Sen and Asheim, we see that they are telling very similar stories. Condition (8) 
and its derivation embodies the essence of most of the relevant lessons from infinite horizon growth 
analyses. They give us the intuition behind (i) how now-convergence of infinite integrals can arise, 
(ii) warn us that convergence depends on long-run parameters such as exogenous growth rates of 
population and productivity, which in the case of climate change are unlikely to be exogenous and 
could be negative, (iii) warn that if we look for optimum growth, these are the same parameter 
constellations that would prevent existence of an optimum, (iv) explain how the non-convergence or 
non-existence of an optimum arises through consumption postponement, (v) explains that the case 
of zero  can over-simplify intuition in a misleading way because with zero , (8) becomes   > n and 
the focus, particularly if n is assumed zero, becomes on   the pure-time discount rate; with non-zero 
, both n and  are relevant (and remember that a long-run α could arise from endogenous 
technical progress, it does not have to be exogenous here, neither does it have to be positive). 
 
Thus condition (8) and its derivation go to the heart of a number of issues and illustrate, inter alia, 
the point that if a model produces difficult or inconsistent results we have to look at its whole 
structure and not just one parameter (here  ). And we should question, as we have emphasised in 
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the context of climate change, one-good, exogenous technical progress, exogenous population 
growth, and the absence of uncertainty. And we must ask whether the particular expression of 
infinite horizons in the mathematical sense we use may, literally, be the tail wagging the dog. It is 
the practical policy challenge of the next several decades which are at issue.  The consequences for 
the next few centuries really do matter but that does not mean that our modelling parameters and 
ethics should be driven by the peculiarities of the convergence of infinite horizon integrals. 
 
1.6 Concluding comments for intertemporal valuation 
We have seen that the context of climate change, in particular the potential breadth of the effects 
across the whole of economic and social life, the potential scale, and the length of the time periods 
involved, requires us to take care to define the intertemporal and intergenerational issues in 
corresponding breadth, scale, and time period.  There is no serious alternative to framing the 
problem as the management of immense risks, to make our discussion of the ethics explicit and to 
put at the centre of that discussion the key issues associated with the scale of risk including potential 
large-scale environmental destruction for future generations, conflict, great poverty, major 
differential impacts across countries and groups at different points of time and substantial loss of life.   
 
Less I be misunderstood, let me be clear that I think that narrow aggregative models, be they in 
growth theory or Integrated Assessment Models of the standard kind often used in this area, have a 
contribution to make. But the contribution is modest and only one part, and not necessarily the 
major part, of an argument. Further, as I have argued in Stern (2013), the Integrated Assessment 
Models have generally grossly under-estimated risks from climate change and thus should not be 
seen as a central case; they are more like extreme cases; “what might happen if we are very lucky". 
 
Nevertheless, the type of models examined above can be useful simple vehicles for bringing out 
some of the key elements of a discussion, including intertemporal and intratemporal values and 
some structural growth features or assumptions. That is why it matters that we show that within this 
narrow framework there are important details that are all too often confused, or plain wrong, in the 
economics literature on ethical values and discounting. That is why we have devoted space to trying 
to clarify them. These have included in particular, inferring discount rates from market rates of 
interest and return, and the issues around pure-time discounting.  
 
There has been some very interesting discussion in economics of discounting which does not commit 
the mistakes described here and which explores important questions. For recent innovative papers 
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see, for example, Guesnerie (2004) who focuses on particular aspects of “more-than-one-good” and 
Sterner and Persson (2008) who incorporate changing relative prices.32  See also useful discussions 
by Dasgupta (2011), Cline (1992), Ackerman and Stanton (2012), Sagoff (2004) and Jamieson (1992).  
It is not the purpose of this paper to review all such arguments.  We have tried to focus attention on 
those intertemporal issues where difficult and important ethical perspectives should enter most 
strongly into economic debate. And there are, of course, valuable approaches to intergenerational 
issues which go outside the standard social welfare approach as we saw in Paper 1. For example, 
there is an interesting discussion of intergenerational justice by Barry (1999) on the basis of 
responsibility for our actions and basic needs or vital interests of future generations.   
 
There is so much economists can contribute to public discussion of intertemporal issues by applying 
their experience of the analyses of key intertemporal questions and the broad range of analytical 
tools at their disposal. But we must heed Sen’s warning: 
 
“If informed scrutiny by the public is central to any such social evaluation (as I believe is the 
case), the implicit values have to be made more explicit, rather than being shielded from 
scrutiny on the spurious ground that they are part of an “already available” metric that society 
can immediately use without further ado.” (Sen, 1999, p. 80). 
 
PART 2: ECONOMICS AND ETHICS OF EQUITY AMONGST PEOPLE AND NATIONS 
 
2.1 The distributional ethics and the nature and scale of the necessary transformation 
Many academic economists in rich countries jump quickly to the assumption that ethics and equity 
in the context of climate change concern primarily intergenerational issues and discounting. On the 
other hand, when those in developing countries focus on equity in the context of public discussion 
and in international negotiations, the most prominent questions concern who cuts emissions by how 
much and when and who contributes what in terms of finance and technology.  The background to 
much of this discussion is that the rich countries got rich on high-carbon growth and are responsible 
for more than 60% of current concentrations in the atmosphere of greenhouse gases.  They 
constitute around 1 billion of a world population now around 7 billion.  Developing countries, with 
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currently around 6 billion people, as they grow more rapidly and fight to overcome poverty are likely 
to be responsible for the bulk of future emissions. 
 
Many in the developing world argue that it is inequitable that they should make substantial cuts in 
emissions, and possibly slow their growth, when the difficult starting point is largely the 
responsibility of rich countries and those countries have the wealth and scientific expertise and 
technologies to pioneer new approaches.  They argue: “shouldn’t the rich countries first make 
drastic cuts themselves and bear the bulk of the extra costs the developing countries will have to 
incur to cut emissions?”  Much of this language is embodied in the framework of the UNFCCC with 
its emphasis on “common but differentiated responsibility”. And it is reflected in the division of the 
Kyoto Protocol into rich countries (“Annex 1”) with "legally binding" responsibilities and developing 
countries with non-binding plans, and a responsibility of the rich countries to meet “full incremental 
costs” (United Nations, 1992, 1998).33 
 
Given the responsibility for past emissions, given that poor people are hit earliest and hardest by 
climate change, and given that all must be strongly involved if emissions cuts on the necessary scale 
are to be achieved, we should ask how we can examine various ethical positions in ways which could 
help structure the policy debate and the framework of international understanding.  The challenge is 
not simply to make interesting observations about ethics. A clear discussion of the ethics and an 
understanding of the consequences of different priorities is of great practical importance both to the 
international discussions and to the perception of the right way to act by particular countries. 
Understanding by participants of what is or is not equitable will have, and has had, a profound effect 
on the negotiations and has shaped the potential for agreement and disagreement. 
 
Before we describe briefly some of the cross-country data on emissions, which is key background to 
an ethical discussion, we should also emphasise the importance in this context of assumptions about 
the necessary scale and nature of the response in terms of emissions reductions, the kind of changes 
that are likely to be involved across the economy, technical progress and how it emerges, and the 
scale of the necessary investments and costs. A failure to understand the scale and nature of the 
necessary response, and the process of dynamic learning which must be at its heart, has distorted 
the ethical discussion. In particular, a narrow formulation of the basic production processes, which 
models a switch to lower carbon activities as simply switching to technologies with higher input-
output coefficients and costs leads to a framing of the discussion in terms of a permanent sacrifice of 
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living standards to protect the environment. It thus pushes the ethical questions towards "who bears 
the incremental cost?" and can lead to a presentation of the issues as being largely about “burden-
sharing”.   
 
That is a language much loved by international bureaucrats but we know in economics that confining 
equity discussions only to the division of a pie can badly miss fundamental issues.  Sadly it is often 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs in particular that seem locked into such language as encapsulating "the 
protection of our interests"; in other words they tend to see negotiations as defensive and a zero-
sum game. The challenge here is to find ways of handling climate change that provide, and are 
understood to provide, very widespread benefits across peoples and over time. And given the nature 
of the problem and the potential attractiveness of alternative paths, we can do just that. The ethical 
issues look very different and much less vexing if we carry that understanding of the nature of the 
problem into the analysis: on the one hand, this is about externality, market failure and inefficiency 
on a massive scale, and, on the other, the response is about discovery and co-benefits in terms of a 
more secure, safe, clean and bio-diverse way of consuming and producing.  There will be initiatives 
to be launched, investments to be made and costs to be borne, and who does what and when 
matters greatly.  But to focus relentlessly and narrowly on the notion of "burden-sharing" risks 
undermining both understanding and agreement. 
 
A focus on the dynamic nature of the economic transformation of the industrial revolution, on 
learning and discovery, and on the benefits of collaboration, reduces the risk of "free-riding", a 
notion much beloved both by the game theorists and those who seek an excuse to do very little. 
Relative to the gloomy, free-riding, view of the world, it is remarkable how many countries are 
willing to act without detailed international agreement; because they see the dangers, they believe 
it is responsible behaviour to contribute to a response, and they see the attractions of an alternative 
path.  The willingness to act is strengthened if there is an understanding of the measures that others 
are taking - better knowledge of what others are doing and discussing is a key factor in individual 
and mutual action. 
 
We have already examined in Paper 1 the emissions reductions which are necessary to achieve a 50-
50 chance of holding to a 2 degrees centigrade increase relative to the 19th century.  Global 
emissions have to be cut from around 50 billion tonnes CO2e per annum now to below 35 in 2030 
and well below 20 in 2050 – a factor of 2½ between now and 2050.  That means, assuming 
population moves from around 7 billion now, to 8 billion in 2030, to 9 billion in 2050, global 
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emissions per capita should diminish from around 7 tonnes CO2e p.a. now, to around 4 in 2030 to 
around 2 in 2050.  Thus if there are not many people below 2 in 2050 there cannot be many above – 
the average is the average.  
 
Emissions per unit of output will have to fall by a factor of about 3 X 2½, or 7 to 8, if global output 
grows by a factor of 3 in the next 40 years (a global growth rate average of 2.8% p.a.).  That is surely 
an energy-industrial revolution.  The scale of change is such that no major sector can be left out, 
neither can any major country or group. It should be seen as a revolution involving radical change in 
how energy is used, and in the patterns of, both production and consumption.  
 
Energy is associated with around 2/3 of global emissions, and agriculture, and deforestation the bulk 
of the remainder. Within energy, it is possible that action on energy efficiency could cover around 
one-half of what is necessary.34  Many of the necessary technologies are emerging and we see rapid 
progress in materials, building and construction, transport and power generation.  The interaction 
with rapid progress in bio-technology, material science and information technology has provided 
great new potential in both energy and resource efficiency and alternative sources of power.  There 
is likely to be much more to come, particularly with stronger investment in R&D.  The story of a 
response on the necessary scale does not depend on some wonderful new technology coming out of 
nowhere, although it is likely that new and productive ideas and opportunities will appear. 
 
If past waves of technological change are a guide, the dynamic and innovatory nature of the new 
industrial revolution will imply that there will be great learning and many opportunities will appear. 
Costs, the direction and the scale of investments will depend on the path followed and the lessons it 
generates. There may be major advantages to the pioneers.  Thus it is very difficult to assign an 
“extra cost” to specific emissions reductions in place A at time t.   
 
These analytical difficulties and their sources, arising as they do from the potential of technological 
and organisational discovery, make specific calculations of how costs of a given emissions reductions 
programme fall on different countries and groups a shaky foundation for policy.  They do not 
remove the relevance of economic and ethical arguments to policy analysis and international 
agreement: such agreements or understandings should indeed concern how rich countries should 
act in their own economies and what they should provide to developing countries in the reshaping 
of their economies.  They do, however, influence how that discussion should be framed.  The 
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analytics should be focused on how poverty reduction and the necessary energy-industrial 
revolution can be fostered in an equitable way. 
 
This is yet another example where the appropriate form of ethical and equity concepts and 
questions depends very sensitively on the basic “positive” (as opposed to normative) economic 
structures which are used to understand the issues: in this case how we model the way the new low-
carbon economic systems develop. It is crucial to keep the idea of a dynamic and radical transition 
and how it can be fostered at the centre of the discussion, because that is the change demanded by 
a serious analysis of the risks embodied in climate change and the opportunities involved in a 
response of appropriate magnitude.  
 
Casting the equity concepts on the back of one particular economic model of production may be 
profoundly misleading.  Past UNFCCC discussions of these issues appear to have been tightly bound 
to a model where alternative production technologies, in particular a switch to low-carbon, are 
assumed to automatically lock in a particular extra cost.  But to force the argument into that 
framework is to implicitly embrace a static model of production which is in conceptual and practical 
conflict with the type of change, investment and learning processes at the heart of the policy 
challenge.  
 
2.2 The basic cross-country data 
As a background to the examination of equity across countries and peoples it is necessary to have 
some data in front of us on relative recent and historical emissions.  These are illustrated in Figures 
2.1 and 2.2 and Tables 2.1 and 2.2 with figures for the main countries (largest emitter nations) for 
total emissions in CO2e and emissions per capita for 2005. Figure 2.3 illustrates carbon dioxide 
emissions over time, from 1975 to 2008 and Figure 2.4 on a per capita basis over the same time 
period.35  
 
China has recently overtaken the USA as the world’s largest emitter (Figure 2.1 and Table 2.1) (we 
should recall that its population is around 4 times as large) and its emissions are rising rapidly. In 
2011 they were probably around 9 billion tonnes of CO2e relative to the figure of just over 7 for 2005 
in Table 2.1. The top 8 countries in emissions are China, USA, EU (27), Brazil, Indonesia, Russia, India 
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and Japan, and are together responsible for close to 70% of total global emissions. They are all large 
countries in terms of one or more of population, output per head and deforestation.  
 
The story in terms of emissions per capita is very different (Figure 2.2 and Table 2.2, and Figure 2.3).  
The United States, Canada and Australia are above 20 tonnes per capita per annum CO2e, China 
around 7, India below 2 (probably close to 2 now) and many African countries between 1 and 2. 
Given the history of high emissions from the rich countries (and thus the use of "carbon space" in 
the past) and the finite carbon space that remains, it is understandable that the debate around 
“equity”, expressed in terms of who takes what of the space that remains, either in terms of actual 
emissions or in terms of rights, is so intense.  It can be seen in Figure 2.3 that developing country 
emissions have overtaken developed country emissions in 2007 and in Figure 2.4 there is an 
acceleration in emissions per capita in developing countries from around 2000 as growth picks up 
and they pass through an energy-intensive phase of development. 
 
Figure 2.1: Top 20 largest emitters in 2005: Total GHG emissions and cumulative percentage of 
global emissions over time.
 
* Data for LULUCF not available. 
Source: CAIT - WRI (2011).  
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Table 2.1: Data for the top 8 largest emitters in 2005: total and percentage GHG emissions.  
 
Country 
Billions of tonnes of 
CO2e (incl. LULUCF) 
Share of global 
total (%) 
China 7.19 16.64 
US 6.80 15.74 
EU 27* 5.04 11.68 
Brazil 2.84 6.58 
Indonesia 2.04 4.73 
Russia 2.01 4.66 
India* 1.86 4.30 
Japan* 1.35 3.12 
* Data for LULUCF not available. 
Source: CAIT - WRI (2011). 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Top 20 largest emitters in 2005: ranked by GHG emissions per capita 
 
* Data for LULUCF not available. 
Source: CAIT- WRI (2011). 
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Table 2.2: Data for the top 8 largest emitters in 2005: ranked by GHG emissions per capita 
Country 
Tonnes of CO2e  
(incl. LULUCF) 
Australia* 27.3 
Canada 24.9 
US 23.0 
Venezuela 16.8 
Saudi Arabia* 16.3 
Brazil 15.3 
Malaysia* 14.6 
Russia 14.1 
* Data for LULUCF not available. 
Source: CAIT- WRI (2011). 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Total carbon dioxide emissions 1975 to 2008: developed and developing countries. 
 
Source: CAIT- WRI (2012). 
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Figure 2.4: Carbon dioxide emissions per capita 1975 to 2008: developed and developing countries. 
 
Source: CAIT- WRI (2012). 
 
Various calculations are available on the “remaining carbon space” on the basis of analysis of the 
kind described in Paper 1, Part 1, on the science (see, e.g. Allen et al., 2009). They point to figures in 
the region of 1,000-1,500 billion tonnes for a 50-50 chance of holding temperature increases to 2oC – 
this is equivalent to about 25 times the current world emissions. We have also argued that emissions 
per capita on average for the world must be around 2 tonnes CO2e in 2050 for paths consistent with 
a 50-50 chance of 2oC, and that since there are unlikely to be very many people well below 2 tonnes, 
there cannot be many well above.  But if actual emissions per capita must be clustering around 2 
tonnes in 2050, we must not misunderstand this as an equity statement.  It follows from the science 
of emissions and warming, from population forecasts and from the basic arithmetic of averages – 
there are no ethical criteria in this calculation.  
 
It is clear that the world will have to take some determined and tough decisions if it is to give itself a 
reasonable chance of holding to 2 degrees centigrade.  In 2030 the overall world budget for 
emissions would be in the region of 32 billion tonnes CO2e.  On current, fairly explicit, plans (see 
Stern, 2011 and 2012a on China’s 12th five year plan), China is likely to go from around 9 billion 
tonnes p.a. now to around 12 in 2020. Currently policy makers in China are speaking of a peak of 
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emissions in 2030.36 A further increase of 3 billion tonnes in annual flows over the decade from 2020 
(say a 25% increase in that decade compared with a likely 33% in the current decade) would take 
China to around 15 billion tonnes in 2030 when the population may be around 1.4 billion (and thus 
per capita emissions 10 or 11 tonnes).  If the USA’s total were 6 or 7 billion tonnes and the EU 
totalled 3 or 4 then in 2030, China, USA and the EU might together total around 25 billion tonnes.  
With an overall global 32 billion tonne per annum budget around that time, that would "leave" 7 
billion tonnes for the other nearly 6 billion of the 8 billion in the world in 2030 (assuming the 
population of China/USA/EU totals a little above 2 billion people in 2030).  That would require this 
6 billion to average close to 1 tonne per capita 20 years from now – that would be extremely unlikely 
to be feasible.  The implication is that China/USA/EU will together have to be far lower than 25 
billion tonnes CO2e in 2030 if a reasonable chance of 2 degrees centigrade is to be realistic.  One can 
see in these figures the potential intensity of the debate on who does what and where and how 
investment and technology are financed.   
 
It is surely clear that (i) there is a great risk that the possibility of giving the world a 50-50 chance of 
2°C will be lost (ii) all must be involved in strong reductions of emissions if we are to have any 
chance of achieving that target, (iii) even if rich country emissions were zero in both 2030 and 2050, 
the per capita emissions of developing countries would have to be around 4-5 tonnes by 2030 and 
2.5 tonnes by 2050; and recall that China is currently heading for 10-11 tonnes per capita in 2030.  It 
is crucial that all countries, both developed and developing, recognise the arithmetic in points (i)-(iii), 
if an outcome which is both effective in reducing emissions as required and ethical in its allocations 
and actions is to be achieved.  
 
2.3 Where and when should reductions take place: carbon space and rigid formulae? 
What sort of principles can we bring to bear in examining targets for countries or for people?  A 
popular assertion is that it is equitable to have per annum "allocations", "quotas" or "permits to 
emit" which are equal for everyone, e.g. for 2050 around 2 tonnes CO2e per person, or for 2030 
around 4 tonnes per person (representing the 32 billion tonne per annum CO2e world budget 
divided by an 8 billion world population) and similarly for intervening periods from now.  Sometimes 
such arguments are augmented by looking at past emissions or at allocations for a period of several 
years or a few decades rather than a single year. We examine such arguments in this subsection: we 
will conclude that the arguments for “equal per capita allocations” do not stand up to close ethical 
and economic examination and conclude that this route does not look promising as a way to analyse 
                                                          
36
 Although in 2013 we heard for the first time a preliminary discussion of the possibility of peaking in 2025 
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the equity issues.  But, let me be clear that a number of key ethical and conceptual concerns about 
the arguments, point to the conclusion that "equal per capita" allocations are not equitable enough. 
 
Past international discussions have got locked into particular formulations of “common but 
differentiated responsibility”, of “full incremental costs”, and of divisions into particular groups of 
developed and developing countries. I will argue that it is time to break away from the narrow 
formulations and examine equity issues on economic and ethical bases which fit better to the 
outcomes and processes the problem demands, i.e. fostering the dynamics of the transition. Lest I 
be misunderstood, this is not an attempt to avoid or play down the equity issues. On the contrary it 
is to take them very seriously indeed and integrate them into approaches that are founded in ethical 
principles and the scale and dynamics of the challenge. 
 
There is at times some evidence that the arguments are moving in this direction. At the UNFCCC in 
Cancun (December 2010), on the basis of language suggested by India the equity issues were 
summarised in terms of “equitable access to sustainable development”, the 2°C target was adopted 
and the idea of a Green Climate Fund endorsed.  Giving meaning to this language offers an 
important way forward and I shall return to the issue below.  At the UNFCCC in Durban (December 
2011), the “gap” between the total of current intentions across countries and the emissions 
necessary for a reasonable chance of 2°C was recognised and the idea of an eventual common legal 
basis, applying to all countries, for emissions targets was accepted. But the tensions over perceived 
equity issues remain intense.  
 
Let us continue our discussion of equity by focussing on the common suggestion of an allocation of 
equal-per-capita quotas each year. Whilst I shall be fairly negative about this proposition, its analysis 
helps illuminate some key questions. If such allocations were made and permits or quotas could be 
marketed then low emitters, mostly poor countries, would be selling permits and rich countries 
would be buying.  At $US 30 a tonne of CO2e (say) in 2030 the total value of a world asset totalling 
32-33 billion tonnes CO2e in 2030 (the world budget) would be $1,000 billion or around a trillion 
dollars.  World GDP then might be $100-150 trillion.  Thus it would be a total world asset that whilst 
large might be of the order of 1% of world GDP. If Africa had, on a population basis, 20-25% of the 
allocation then the value of the allocation at $200-250 billion might represent of the order of 20% of 
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its GDP and would likely be a large multiple of foreign aid. And the carbon price might be, indeed 
should be,37 far higher than $US 30 per tonne CO2e in 2030.  
 
We must take care, however, in understanding how carbon markets might work. The price for 
marginal trades should be equal across countries and high enough to limit demand to the carbon 
budgets, if efficiency and effectiveness are to be achieved. But not all trades need take place at the 
marginal price.  
 
The “logic” behind the assertion that allocations should be equal appears to be the claim that “there 
should be equal rights for each person to the atmospheric commons” where the size of the 
commons in each year is represented by the carbon budget.  This is a story articulated by many (see 
e.g. Agarwal and Narain, 1991; Jamieson, 2001; Baer, 2002; Hohne et al., 2006; Singer in ed. 
Gardiner, 2010), with varying degrees of rigour in the arguments offered.  The proposition clearly 
has some instinctive attraction to many.   
 
The argument, at least in its simple form, has serious problems scientifically, ethically and 
economically.  Scientifically, equality on a flow basis makes little sense: it is the time path of 
concentrations that is of primary importance in determining warming and climate change.  But if we 
switch to stocks we find that equality which focuses on stocks or the sum of flows over a period of 
time raises very difficult questions of when the “clock should start” for the summation.  Is it now, so 
that e.g. everyone has an equal share of the total, say, 1,000 billion tonnes of headroom that 
remains?  What is the relevant population given that it has changed over recent history, and will 
change, differently in different places?  Should there be accounting for past emissions?  Is there a 
responsibility starting from when the problem was scientifically identified and embraced by the body 
politic?  When was that – Fourier in the 1820s, the launch of the IPCC in 1988, the creation of the 
UNFCCC in 1992?  Thus criteria based on equal per capita allocations have deep conceptual and 
practical problems.  Nevertheless, if we go down the route specified by this argument, it would be 
hard to argue in favour of a starting date later than 1992.  The emissions by rich countries in the 20 
years since then have consumed a great deal of "carbon space"38 and these actions of emitting 
should have a bearing on moral responsibilities from most ethical perspectives. 
 
                                                          
37
 For example, market prices of $50 or more may be necessary to sustain carbon capture and storage which 
itself is likely to be a necessary part of path holding to 2°C.  
38
 Probably of the order of half a trillion tonnes CO2e.  
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Ethically, the assertion of a right to the atmospheric commons is not one which it is easy to explain 
or justify.  There are some who might argue that there is a right to development, a right to energy or 
a right to shelter associated with basic human needs.  These rights do have a reasoned basis, see e.g. 
Sen (1999, 2009), and some are embodied in constitutions (see e.g. South Africa).  But these neither 
separately nor together imply a right to emit. There are no fixed coefficients between development, 
shelter or energy on the one hand, and emissions on the other.  Indeed policy on climate change is in 
large measure about altering those coefficients.39   Further emissions cause real damage to, indeed 
can kill many from, future generations.  Is there a right to endanger life?  As the late Prime Minister 
Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia put it in Durban in December 2011 on Africa Day at the UNFCCC gathering 
“It is not equity or justice to foul the planet because others have fouled it in the past”40.  
 
If we change the language from "rights" to tradeable quotas then the issues look somewhat different: 
economically, the issues concern the distribution of a new asset, perhaps of total value of the order 
of $1 trillion p.a. in 2030.  There is nothing in the economics of public policy that points to each 
person in the world being entitled to an equal share, e.g. $125 for each person, if there are 8 billion 
people in 2030.  Most distributional frameworks in theory and in practice would point to poorer 
people getting more.  There are some, implausibly in my view, who argue that allocation of quotas 
should be in relation to production (with some standard coefficient relating emissions to production). 
They invoke the idea that everyone should be at liberty to produce what they can and policy should 
focus on encouraging greater carbon efficiency in the sense of reducing emissions per unit of output.  
The efficiency aspects of the argument of this last sentence are not mistaken; what is illogical is to 
say that it implies that those who are richer, in the sense that they produce more, have a 
proportionally greater right to damage others through their emissions, in being entitled to quotas 
related to production; the argument about efficiency is silent on equity. 
 
If one attempts a formulaic approach to allocations, in a standard context in welfare or public 
economics with a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function, it might look something like the 
following. We could fix the “starting date” To for “knowledge of problem” and total available 
resources for transfer payments as X (this can also be a choice variable). We could then fix the 
“remaining pot” of emissions as Y (although in some modelling approaches this might also be a 
                                                          
39
 Some appear to advocate equal per capita emissions as a ‘pragmatic’ expression of equal right to 
development on the grounds that emissions are necessary for development. But, as I have argued, whilst 
energy may be necessary there is no rigid relationship between energy and income/output or between energy 
and emissions. The challenge is indeed to break the relationship between energy and emissions and use 
energy much more efficiently. Further, the insistence on such a formula is not ‘pragmatic’ if the formulation 
leads to deadlock (see below).   
40
 I was part of the panel discussion during which he made the remark. 
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choice variable) constraining the sum over i and t of yit, emissions of country i at time t. Then we 
could set up criteria for evaluating how yit and xit (the compensation or transfer payment to country i 
at time t) should be determined as a function of X, To, and Y. In most simple models with concave 
social welfare functions (diminishing social marginal utility of income) we could not avoid the formal 
conclusion that allocation of the resources available for transfer payments should be largely to the 
poorest (e.g., up to point of equal social marginal utility of income).  The allocation of a tradeable 
emissions quota is essentially a transfer in this type of model.41  
 
The argument of the last two paragraphs emphasises the importance of avoiding seeing justice and 
rights only in terms of the one dimension of emissions: Caney has termed such a perspective 
'isolationism' (see Caney, 2010, p. 214 for a discussion).  Certainly most applications of the 
economics of public policy (see above) would regard income and wealth as relevant to the allocation 
of emissions quotas.  But while 'isolationism' makes little sense, because we can recognise 
immediately some factors beyond emissions which are relevant to distributional allocation of quotas, 
we do encounter difficult problems when we go beyond it.  Should rich countries be credited with 
their development of technologies?  Should the British be credited with the Indian railways built 
under colonialism; if so, then what about the debts incurred and crimes committed by the British in 
the colonial period? 
 
2.4 The danger of impasse and a way forward 
There have been various attempts to create one-dimensional42 “formulae for equity” along the lines 
just discussed, relating to past and current emissions, see e.g. the 2010 Tata Institute of Social 
Science report, and papers from the Tata Institute of Social Science, ‘Global Carbon Budgets and 
Equity in Climate Change' conference on June 28-29, 2010.  Generally they share key elements of the 
above formal structure and thus tend to point to “allocations of rights or permits” which are similar 
to, or still stronger in allocations to poor countries, than equal per capita rights to the remaining 
carbon space  
 
One might try to invoke an argument that places where emissions reductions can be made very 
cheaply should have a downward adjustment in allocation to avoid creating an “excessive rent” 
associated with the happenstance of their location or past. This reflects the reservations which arose 
                                                          
41
 One could complicate by building in various incentive and response structures to transfer payments, but the 
basic point of the direction and magnitude of transfers being strongly influenced by the social marginal utility 
of income would stand. 
42
 Or 'isolationist' in the Caney sense. 
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when Russia received high allocations under Kyoto because energy usage in the former Soviet Union 
was so inefficient and allocations were in part historically based. The problem was referred to as 
“hot air”: Russia faced no or negative cost in complying with emissions targets created in this way 
and had a lot of permits to sell. Interestingly there has been a disinclination to buy such permits on 
the grounds that they do not represent “real reductions” – i.e. one would be buying “hot air”. This 
suggests that under Kyoto the emphasis was on finding efficient ways of reducing overall emissions 
by the necessary amounts, and getting international agreement via grandfathering existing 
allocations.  Grandfathering embodies the notion of entrenched rights associated perhaps with costs 
of change or avoiding "retrospective" taxation. There appears to have been a disinclination to see 
the allocation of permits as a large-scale method of income distribution, particularly by those, often 
the richer countries, who saw themselves as potential losers.  
 
Elsewhere (see Stern, 2009) I have argued that global agreements on climate change should be 
“effective, efficient, and equitable” both as a matter of principle, but also pragmatically if they are to 
be built and sustained. The discussions around Kyoto and on “hot air” point to an apparent desire, at 
least by some countries, to have allocations and trading mechanisms focused on effectiveness 
(meeting the desired overall reduction targets) and efficiency (keeping the costs down).  It seems 
that in those discussions, implicitly or explicitly, there was a mutual understanding, rightly or 
wrongly, that the subject of equity should be handled in some other way, or perhaps the rich 
countries thought it should have a very limited role.  
 
How should we evaluate this perspective or implicit understanding? Standard second-best welfare 
economics says that if income distribution mechanics are constrained (e.g. by disincentive effects of 
income taxation or income-contingent transfers) then policies focused primarily on other issues, 
such as efficiency, should have their distributional impacts included in any assessment.43 And this is 
revealed in practice to be important in public discussions of, say, energy or water pricing. In this 
'public economics' approach, if a new instrument emerges, such as the allocation of quotas, then its 
potential for improving income distribution should be regarded as an advantage.  
 
That argument is technically correct and of substance. But in the case of cross-country transfers we 
already have mechanisms, used insufficiently in my view, to make transfers. But those in rich 
countries choose to make, via those mechanisms, only modest transfers as overseas development 
                                                          
43
 See e.g. Drèze and Stern (1990), or more generally, e.g. the Journal of Public Economics.  The arguments go 
back at least to James Meade and Paul Samuelson in the 1950s and are expressed with great lucidity in 
Meade's book "Trade and Welfare" (1955) and its mathematical supplement.  
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assistance. Sometimes issues such as corruption, ineffectiveness or “aid-dependence” are raised. But 
it seems reasonable to conclude that larger transfers are not made mainly because the people and 
political systems of rich countries do not want to make them.  In other words, there is an underlying 
feeling that “I do not feel the obligation to give very much to poor countries” and "my sense of 
community responsibility for inequality does not extend strongly to the rest of the world". If this is 
the case, as I think it is, we cannot expect agreement by those in rich countries to make large 
transfers, perhaps considerably larger than current or planned overseas aid, through another route. 
We can try the arguments about paying for past pollution but the evidence of international 
discussion suggests they are unlikely to have strong traction.  I write as someone who has tried, with 
very limited success, both the distributional and compensation arguments publicly and privately in 
international discussion. And I have observed the largely unsuccessful efforts of others. 
 
Equity, at least if it is formulated in the rather mechanical and one-dimensional ways we have 
discussed, via quotas and rights, is on a collision course with practical politics; we seem, in this 
discussion, to have arrived at an impasse. Equity arguments and historical responsibility together 
point to allocations of emissions rights which would give large transfers to poor countries. Yet rich 
countries are most unlikely to accept the arguments for so doing or at least they will refuse to make 
the transfers, whether or not they acknowledge the validity of the arguments. The result, if we insist 
on acceptance and implementation of these rights and transfers before action by poor countries is 
agreed or implemented, will be the most inequitable of all – unmanaged climate change.  However 
frustrating and unjust it may seem, there seems little sense in insisting on one narrow, and 
conceptually problematic, formulation of equity, i.e. via quotas, if such insistence is likely to lead to 
this outcome.  Demonstrating that the equity case is very powerful (beyond an emissions per capita 
approach) does help show how deeply unattractive rich country intransigence is – but a rigid and 
formulaic view blocks progress.  Whilst the poor countries have much the better of the argument on 
equity, the rigidity or intransigence of two groups (poor countries insisting on only one way of 
formulating equity, and rich countries saying "that is unacceptable") is holding hostage the future of 
their children and risks severe damage or destruction.  And it is poor people who are at the most risk.  
 
But there is a way forward. It is not to drop the equity criteria but to embed them in the twin ideas 
of rich countries embarking on a dynamic and attractive transition to the low-carbon economy in 
their own economies and supporting that transition in the developing world as a policy chosen by 
those countries themselves as a driver of growth and poverty reduction that is capable of becoming 
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sustained.  In other words to give life to the idea of “equitable access to sustainable development” 
proposed by India and adopted in the UNFCCC agreement in Cancun in December 2010.  
 
To do this we must start by being clear about five things: first, the scale of the necessary emissions 
reductions; second, that a radical economic transformation is required; third, that it will have many 
attractive features beyond reducing climate risk; fourth, that it is a sustainable growth story with 
great potential for overcoming poverty in the next few decades; fifth, substantial investment 
resources and new technologies are required.  An attempt at high-carbon growth will self-destruct 
on the deeply hostile physical environment it is likely to create.  There is little point in "equitable 
access to a train wreck".  And neither should we try to make the transition to sustainable 
development by expecting poor countries to make the necessary substantial investments without 
strong support in resources and technology. 
 
This is not the place for an extended discussion of “equitable access to sustainable development”. 
However, it should start with what is necessary for a transition to a low-carbon economy because 
that is central to sustainable development. An analysis of policies would focus on a dynamic public 
economics of change. This could start by analysis of some basic market failures: (i) emissions of 
GHGs; (ii) R & D and the publicness of knowledge and discovery; (iii) networks (electricity grids, 
broadband, public transport, re-cycling, and so on); (iv) weakness in long-run capital markets in 
handling risks; (v) information on available goods and services concerning options, e.g. energy 
efficiency opportunities; (vi) co-benefits (energy security, biodiversity, safety…). For a further 
discussion see Stern (2012). 
 
The “equitable” in “equitable access to sustainable development” would concentrate on the nature 
and type of support. It would be directly influenced by attitudes to discounting, risk and inequality; 
the lower the pure-time discounting, the greater the risk aversion and the greater the aversion to 
inequality the more powerful are the ethical arguments for strong support by rich countries in 
resources and technology for the transition in poor countries. Research to provide evidence, 
structure and life to the idea of “equitable access to sustainable development” should be the highest 
priority. It will require economists, economic historians, political scientists, philosophers, scientists, 
engineers and many more professional skills. And, critically, the involvement of business people, 
investors and politicians.  
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There are some who might interpret this concept as requiring “zero-growth”, particularly in rich 
countries, as a number of authors (e.g. Jackson, 2009) have proposed. There are three reasons I find 
the arguments unconvincing; quantification, focus, political.  
 
Quantitative: if all countries stopped growth now our global emissions at 50 billion tonnes CO2 p.a. 
are, as we have seen, far too high to be consistent with avoiding dangerous climate change. Focus: it 
follows that the focus of attention should be breaking the link between production and consumption 
on the one hand and emissions on the other, and a zero-growth proposition could divert attention. 
Political: if we try to turn this into a battle about growth rather than the nature of growth, or express 
it as an artificial horse-race between growth and climate responsibility, the most likely outcome is 
that growth will win and climate responsibility will lose. That would be the most inequitable of 
outcomes.  
 
Countries and people in the developing world will examine their own circumstance and 
opportunities and thus transition paths. And there is much the rich world can do to support analysis 
of what is possible, providing resources and finance, and developing and sharing technologies. In the 
process we will begin to define the meaning(s) of “equitable access to sustainable development”.44  
 
 
PART 3: SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS: (1) AVOIDING SHOE-HORNS AND BLINKERS IN 
ECONOMICS AND ETHICS; (2) COLLABORATIVE NOT FORMULAIC ROUTES TO EQUITABLE ACCESS 
TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
 
3.1. Applying the ethics 
3.1.1 Modelling 
Conclusion 1.  Attempts to force a problem concerning immense risks into a model of minor 
perturbations within standard aggregative growth models distort the basic scientific, economic and 
ethical issues. They often lead to the misleading conclusion that there should be high discounting, 
and thus small weight on medium-term and longer-term climate impacts, on the grounds that future 
generations will be rich, as a result of the assumed growth.  
Let me be clear, this is not to dismiss modelling; far from it.  It is simply to say that shoe-horning 
climate issues into a model with perturbations around a growth path with given underlying growth 
drivers or rates, risks omitting the key issues of the possibility of immense damages which reverse 
growth and development. Discounting future effects on the assumption that the inexorable driving 
                                                          
44 See Romani, Rydge and Stern (2012). 
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force of underlying growth in such models will mean future generations are automatically "well-off" 
is to misunderstand both the science and the processes of growth;45 it comes close to assuming 
directly that discount rates must be high and that effects in the medium-term future are of little 
importance.   
 
3.1.2 Discounting 
Conclusion 2.  Some infinite horizon models with key assumptions and axioms concerning growth and 
social preferences can lead to non-convergence of utility integrals, paradoxes of "over-saving" and 
possible incompleteness of social orderings. We showed, in a simple one-good growth model of the 
Ramsey kind, that these phenomena are closely connected and that the conclusion that we should 
respond to these problems by imposing pure-time discounting was invalid. Non-convergence or 
incompleteness arise from a number of assumptions and can be avoided by adjusting some of them 
(for example concerning the role of long-run growth or distributional values). And incompleteness of 
an ordering over an infinite horizon may not be a reason to reject assumptions if they appear valid 
for other reasons and the ordering can handle the key questions at issue. 
It is well-known that there are "paradoxes of infinity", and they require examination, but it would be 
unwise to insist that their technical resolution requires us to recast our core moral values. We may, 
for example, want to re-examine the assumptions about growth and infinite horizons. Technically, 
problems of incompleteness of social orderings are closely related to the paradoxes of infinity. These 
arise in an approach based on axiomatic social choice theory, in the context of a set of assumptions, 
including Pareto sensitivity, zero pure-time discounting (or anonymity), and infinite utility streams. 
But that does not imply that one particular assumption in the set should be jettisoned. And 
incompleteness may not be too worrying if the criteria can deal with the choices at hand.  
 
The immense dangers of unmanaged climate change can arise with quite high probability 50 or 100 
years from now and many of the people likely to be affected are already alive and amongst us.  We 
need economic analysis which examines these great issues directly and which avoids dismissing the 
central question of the management of these immense risks by the arbitrary devices of asserting or 
assuming inexorable growth or insisting on technical devices such as strong pure-time discounting 
which have dubious ethical foundations. We have to examine ethical issues directly and bring the 
economic modelling in line with the risks at issue. 
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 See Stern (2013) for a development of this discussion. 
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Conclusion 3.  Discounting long-term climate impacts by inferring discount rates from current and 
historical market rates involves basic errors in this context, arising from mis-specification of the 
underlying model, of the ethical questions and of the definitions of discounting, and from ignoring 
key market failures. Further, attempts to infer social valuations for use in intertemporal evaluation of 
climate policy from explicit or implicit public decisions, which may be deemed to be "analogous" to 
decisions relevant for climate change are largely inconclusive and likely to remain so. 
Assuming that underlying future growth will be like the past is a basic mis-specification of choices in 
relation to climate change and its possible consequences; so too is the assumption of just one 
aggregate good when the environment and its effect on lives and survival of many are at stake. Of 
course, all models are simplifications but in this context these assumptions are so badly wrong the 
conclusions are simply unacceptable.  Attempting to derive relevant evaluation criteria or 
parameters from market discount rates or rates of return generally depends on completely 
untenable assumptions about those markets: such derivation would generally require us to assume 
perfect information, the existence of very long-term markets for trades based on collective decisions, 
and so on. 
 
Attempting to derive values from “inverse optimum” analyses of public decisions is undermined by 
the need to model the constraints and incentive structures which are assumed to be perceived by 
the "optimisers".  As we saw in the optimum growth discussion in (Conclusion 1) above, different 
assumptions on the perceptions of the "optimisers" give such different answers as to render such an 
approach thoroughly inconclusive.  Similar sensitivity is observed in attempts to derive values from 
tax or expenditure decisions. 
 
That public sector discount rates for projects over 20 or 30 year horizons may be at, say, 3-6% real or 
more is not evidence that pure-discount rates should be high.  Often risk in the business or political 
environment plays a prominent role in arguments for such rates and such risk to a particular project 
may not be small.  The pure-time discount rate in the context of social welfare evaluation is a 
concept logically separate from that kind of treatment of risk.46 Further, the assumption that 'public 
decisions' can be seen as if they are the actions of a single optimiser is itself problematic. 
 
Conclusion 4.  Given conclusions 1, 2, 3, arguments for heavy pure-time discounting are (i) usually 
purely asserted or assumed, or (ii) invoked by appeal to the empirical existence of short-termism. 
                                                          
46
 Modelling risks concerned with exogenous threats to the existence of the population of the planet can have 
a mathematical form similar to that of pure-time discounting. 
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They are asserted or assumed in the sense that notwithstanding conclusions 1, 2, 3 above, and their 
demonstration of the weakness of a conceptual or ethical case for pure-time discounting, a modeller 
finds it convenient to use a high pure-time discount rate for the particular model constructed in 
order to avoid the failure of the model, for example via the divergence of infinite integrals: this is 
confused pragmatism in the context of a model, which is likely to be inappropriate to the issue at 
hand. That many people act in short-sighted ways or as if they had heavy discount rates is not an 
argument that collective ethical issues should be settled in this way.  And, sadly, some people, 
including some economists, appear to confuse pure-time discount rates and discount rates. 
 
The proposition that pure-time discounting should be zero is generally derived from the principle of 
equal treatment of people in similar circumstances. In other words, it is regarded as ethically right to 
treat the lives of different individuals equally and not to discriminate between lives by happenstance 
of the date of birth at which they began.  This idea of equal treatment or neutrality is itself a clear 
and transparent principle which is common in many constitutional and legal arrangements, and can 
be derived from a number of ethical positions. 
 
3.1.3 Equity across people and nations 
Conclusion 5.  Most formulaic approaches to equity in relation to group or country allocations of, 
quotas for, or rights to "carbon space" have serious problems scientifically, ethically and 
economically.  
Scientifically, what matters for warming and climate change are the levels of concentrations over 
time, rather than flows.  Ethically, carbon emissions appear to be a strange basis for a discussion of 
rights: we may invoke rights to development and recognise the importance of energy, but that is not 
to speak of a right to emit.  There are no fixed coefficients between development and emissions, and 
emissions threaten directly lives and livelihoods; the challenge is to break the link between 
emissions and economic activity and we know it to be possible.  Economically, the allocation of a 
tradeable quota is an allocation of a financial asset, and in an unequal world there is no strong case 
for equal allocation of such an asset.  In transfer systems, in practice most people argue that poor 
people should get more.  This illustrates the dangers of looking at rights and justice in this context in 
a way which focuses on just one dimension, emissions.  
 
Various attempts to create “formulae for equity” tend to point to “allocations of emissions rights or 
permits” which would give large transfers to poor countries. Rich countries, however, are most 
unlikely to accept the arguments for so doing, or at least be unwilling to act on them whether or not 
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they regard them as appropriate.  Thus, notwithstanding that the poor countries have powerful 
ethical arguments in their demand for carbon space and transfers of resources and technology, a 
purist insistence on formulae which are based on one-dimensional treatments of allocation is likely 
to lead to policy impasse and inaction.  That is the most inequitable outcome of all, with poor 
countries being hit earliest and hardest by climate change.   
 
Conclusion 6.  Reframing interpersonal and cross-country questions as "equitable access to 
sustainable development" is a promising way of casting the policy issues and analysis: it recognises 
the importance of ethics, the dynamic nature of the necessary economic transformation, and is more 
likely to lead to agreement. 
Abandoning an attempt to embody ethics in policy, because of the difficulties of a narrow formulaic 
approach, makes little ethical, political or practical sense. But there is a way forward. It is not to drop 
the equity criteria but to embed them in the idea of rich countries fostering the dynamic and 
attractive transition to the low-carbon economy in both their own countries and supporting 
developing countries in their drive for an approach to growth and poverty reduction which is both 
effective and sustainable. In other words to give life to the idea of “equitable access to sustainable 
development”.  Thus what is dropped is not the ethics but a particularly narrow and static version of 
the underlying economics, one which risks derailing progress. Progress requires both developing and 
developed countries to see the opportunities and ethics in a different way so that they can 
understand that there are dynamic gains that make the problem very different from a "zero-sum" 
game of "burden-sharing". 
 
Detailed discussion of the meaning of sustainable development has not been our prime purpose 
here.47 "Equitable access" surely refers to the ability to participate in sustainable development.  That 
will mean support from those who have the wealth, learning and technology by both demonstrating 
what is possible in their own actions and assisting others in finding ways to achieve sustainable 
development in their own circumstances. 
 
In putting policies together it must be recognised that sustainable development has to be 
understood at individual, community, country and global levels.  Those perspectives should not be 
taken narrowly only in terms of country-to-country discussions.  The idea of sustainability is indeed 
relevant to country-country analyses and negotiations but equitable access to sustainable 
development applies within countries.  And sharing, for example of new ideas and approaches, can 
                                                          
47
 Although we have presented key concepts and see, e.g., Stern, 2009 or Lionel Robbins Lectures, 2012, for 
some further development. 
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go in a number of geographical and intellectual directions.  The paper does not attempt to pursue 
the analysis of sustainable development any further, but it does emphasise that this approach does 
have sound ethical, scientific and economic foundations and seems a sensible and practical way 
forward as a basis for international and other discussions. Research on “equitable access to 
sustainable development” should be high priority and will require the collaboration of a whole range 
of professional skills, as well as investors, large and small, and politicians.  
 
3.2. A way forward 
Conclusion 7.  Policies for sustainable development and overcoming poverty require breaking the link 
between production and consumption activities on the one hand and emissions on the other.  
Essentially we need a new energy-industrial revolution. 
Agreement on the implementation of fundamental change from the past and on the fostering of a 
new energy-industrial revolution requires clarity on five key issues and propositions: the scale of 
emissions reductions; second, that a dynamic and radical economic transformation is necessary for 
those reductions; third, that it will have many attractive features beyond reducing climate risk; 
fourth, that it is a sustainable growth story with great potential for overcoming poverty; fifth, 
substantial investment and new technologies are required. Such a picture of the necessary response 
including its radical nature and the importance of the dynamics of learning and transition, is a crucial 
part of the whole challenge of putting the science, ethics and economics together.  Describing the 
dire consequences of inaction is a fundamental part of the ethical case; but there should also be a 
description of the other paths and why they look so much more attractive, over and above the great 
reductions in climate risks they can deliver.  In this case, the alternative paths do indeed appear very 
attractive: cleaner, quieter, safer, more secure and more bio-diverse. 
 
The principal purpose of both Paper 1 and 2 has been to set a framework for the ethical analysis of 
climate change in the context of the science and economics.  The detailed economics will involve, 
inter alia, the economics of: growth and development; public policy; technological change; 
environment; game theory; international relations; finance; economic history; institutions and so on. 
We, as economists, have so much to offer. If we start with a careful examination of the science and 
the relevant ethics, then the economic analysis of policy can be, and I think should be, in the lead.  If 
we try to narrow the science and ethics to fit with the most convenient and familiar economic 
models and approaches we risk distorting the ethics and the science, creating deeply misleading 
policy conclusions and undermining the credibility of our discipline.  
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In the process of pursuing our purpose we have not only drawn the above conclusions, including 
those from Paper 1.  We have also seen that the way we frame and discuss the ethical arguments is 
likely to have a profound effect on policy discussions and the ability to gain international agreement.  
Reasoned ethical argument, its foundations, and the way it is conducted are vital to policy-making, 
not just conceptually, but also practically.  Ethics matters. 
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